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1.ABSTRACT 
What  the  European  Union  has  achieved  over  the  last  fifty  years  in  the  
field  of  agricultural  production  can  be  regarded  as  simply  phenomenal  in  
the  light  of  the  circumstances  which  faced  the  architects  of  the European  
Union. European  nations  were  still  recovering  from  the  effects  of  World  
War Two, one   of  them  being  the  lack  of  food  resources  and  food  security. 
The  implementation  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  in 1962 appeared  to  
be  a  masterstroke  at  first  for  the  European  Community.  Food  shortages  
across  Europe  were   eliminated  and  farmers  and  those  dependent  on  the  
agricultural  sector  for  their  livelihoods  were  guaranteed  a  sustainable  future  
in  the  agricultural  sector. However  the  European  dream  has  over  time 
degenerated  into  a  nightmare  not  only  for  the  citizens  of  the  European  
Union, who  have  to  bear  the  massive  costs  of  sustaining  the  EU’s  support  
for  the  CAP  and  the  agricultural  sector, but  most  importantly  for  the  
farmers, rural  communities  and  agricultural  sectors  within  the  developing  
world. 
 
It    appears  that  farmers  and  the  agricultural sectors  in  developing  countries   
are  trapped in  an  almost  inescapable  vicious  circle  with  the  European  
Union. As  a  result  of  multilateral   trade  agreements, farmers  in  these  nations  
have  to  compete  with   heavily  subsidised  European  agricultural  imports. 
These  imports are significantly  cheaper  than  their  domestic  rivals. Of  course  
in  this   battle  for  the  consumer  there  is  only  one  winner. Domestic  
producers  simply  cannot  compete  at  the  same  level  as  their  European  
counterparts. What  makes  the  situation  even  more  galling  is  that  if  
agricultural  producers  in  certain  developing  nations  tried  to  export  to  the  
European Union, they  would  be  subject  to  high  tariffs  and  duties.  This  in  
turn  makes  it  harder  for  these  producers  to  gain  a  foothold  within  the  
European  market. 
 
In  this  thesis, I  will  be  examining  the  factors  I  believe  are  instrumental  in  
this  trade  imbalance  between  the  European  Union  and  the  developing  world  
in  the  agricultural  sector. I  will  be  focusing  my  attention  on  the main  
reason  I  believe  an  imbalance  exists: the  continued  use  and  implementation  
of  export  subsidies  by  the  European  Union.  
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The  issue  of  export  subsidies  has  been  the  bane  of  many  World Trade 
Organisation  negotiations  and  an  issue  that  I  believe  has  to  be  dealt  with  
decisively once  and  for all  to  ensure  equal  playing  fields between  the  EU  
and  developing  nations  in  the  agricultural  sector. 
 
2.KEYWORDS 
Export  subsidies, international  trade law, European  Union, Common  
Agricultural  Policy, South  Africa , agriculture , developing nations, exports, 
prohibition, fair  trading  practices, competition, World Trade Organisation. 
 
3. AIMS  OF  THIS  STUDY 
In  my  discussions  I  will  attempt  to  highlight  the inadequacies  which  exist  
in  the  current  trade  relationship  between  the  European  Union  and  
developing  nations  in  particular  South Africa  with  regard  to  agricultural  
produce. Through  my  arguments  and  research  I  will show  that  the  European  
Union  has  maintained  a  policy  of   hypocrisy  by  giving  certain agricultural  
producers  in developing  nations  a  few  benefits while  on  the  one  hand  
continuing  to  supply  the ailing  agricultural  industry  in  Europe  with  massive  
amounts  of  subsidies  and  incentive  packages. In  the  end  I  will  attempt  to  
show  that  the  abolishment  of  export  subsidies  by  the  European  Union  
would  truly  result  in  tangible  benefits for  farmers in  the  developing  world  
and   in  particular  in  South  Africa. 
 
 
4.PROBLEM  STATEMENT 
The  issue  over  export  subsidies  has  long  proved  to  be  a controversial  
subject in  multilateral  trade  negotiations  between  developed  and  developing 
nations. The European  Union  have  always  used  the  argument   that  the  use  
of  agricultural  export  subsidies  is  necessary  to  support  their  farmers  and  
producers  economically  and  that  it is  vital  to  retain  the  so  called ‘ rural  way  
of   life’.  
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The  argument  by  the  Europeans  seems  incongruous  considering  that  
European  farmers   are  not  facing  a  struggle  to  survive  or  to  generate  a  
living  or  the  fact  that   2003  statistics  show  that  only  about  5%  of   the 
Union’s  population  is  still  involved  in  some  way  with  the  agricultural 
sector. The  statistics  for  2003  show  that  1.3 billion  euros  of  the  Union’s  
budget  was  devoted  to  providing  export  subsidies  to  the  farmers.  
 
Surely  this  seems  to  be a  heavy  price  to  pay  for  EU  citizens  in  order  to  
maintain  a  sector  of  the  economy  which   has  become  inflated  with   all  the  
EU  government  aid  and  subsidies  being  pumped  in  order  to  prop  up  the  
agricultural  sector. I  believe  most  EU  citizens  are  labouring  under  the  
impression  that  the  export  subsidies  are  used  to  assist  poor  farmers  living  
in  a  picturesque  rural  countryside. In  reality  a  huge  chunk  of  that  EU  
export  subsidy  budget  makes  it  way  into  the  coffers  of  large, commercial  
agribusiness  enterprises. 
 
The  issue  that  will  be  of  particular  significance  to  the  South  African  
agriculture  sector  is  EU  support  for its  sugar  industry. In  2003, the  EU  spent  
about  3.30  euros  in  subsidies  for  every  1 euro’s  worth  of  sugar. These 
figures  make  for  interesting  reading. Britain  is  not  the  first  country  that  
springs  to  mind  when  one  thinks  of  large  scale  producers  of  sugar  on  the  
world  stage. Yet  because  of  EU  export  subsidy  support, Britain  and  other  
European  nations  have  been  able  to  surpass  traditional  producers  such  as  
South  Africa. In  a  study  conducted  by  Oxfam  in  2003, it was  found  that  
twenty-seven  of  the largest  sugar-beet  farmers  in  the  United  Kingdom  
benefited  from  subsidies  to the  tune  of  206, 910  euros. No  wonder  with  all  
this  support  the  “poor”  sugar  farmers  of  Europe  have  been  able  to  produce  
five  million  tonnes  of  surplus  sugar. This  surplus  of  course  ends up  on  the  
world  markets  and  leads  to  a  depression  in  the  price  of  sugar , making  it  
that  much  more  difficult  for  the  sugar  farmer  in  South  Africa  to  compete  
with  his   heavily  subsidised European  counterparts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4
5.THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  STUDY 
The  significance  of  this  research is  to  understand  and  evaluate  the  impact   
the  European  Union’s  export  subsidy  program, through  its  Common  
Agricultural  Program,  has  had  on  the  South  African  agricultural  sector. In  
this  mini-thesis, the  focus  will  mainly  be  on  the  South  African  sugar  
industry  as  well  as  a  few  other  agricultural  commodities  which  are  able  to  
compete  effectively  on  the  world  market. 
 
If  the  export  subsidies  provided  to  European  farmers  were  eliminated, South  
African  sugar  producers  would  move  a  step  closer  to  competing  on  level  
playing  fields  with  their  European  counterparts. This  would  of  course  have  
a significant  impact  on the  South  African  sugar  industry  and  the   
approximately    51 000 sugar   producers  in   South  Africa, the  majority  of  
which  are  mostly  small  scale  farmers.  
Together  with  these  farmers, a  further  85 000  people  are  reliant  on   an  
income  closely  related  to  the  sugar  industry. So  if  the  EU were  serious  
about  its  promises  to  reform  the CAP and  in  particular  export  subsidies, 
these  possible  reforms  would  not  only  have  an  important  economic  impact  
on  South  Africa (significant  percentage  of  South Africa’s  workforce is  in  
some  way  connected  to  the  agricultural  industry.) but would   also  have  
socio-economic  implications  for  South  Africa 
 
6.METHODOLOGY 
The  methodology  undertaken  to  conduct  my  research  will  be  primarily  
based  on  a  literature  review. I  will be  focusing  my  attention  on  literature  
sources  related  to EU’s CAP  policies, export subsidy programs, the  relationship 
between  South  Africa  and  the  EU  with  a  particular  emphasis  on  the  Trade  
and  Development  Cooperation  Agreement. Sources  and  information  related  to  
WTO  agreements  relevant  to  the  issue  such  as  the  Agreement  on  
Agriculture as  well  as  other  relevant  sources  will  be  utilised. Information  
and  studies  conducted  by  organisations  such  as  OXFAM  are   relevant  in   
assessing  the socio-economic impacts  of  the  EU  export  subsidies  program. 
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7. CHAPTER  OVERVIEW 
Chapter one  is  basically the  introduction  for  the  whole  process  of  research  
for  this  mini-thesis. It  sets  out  the  scope  and  area  of  investigation  for  this  
topic  as  well  as  the  methodology  to  be   employed  in conducting  the 
research. 
 
Chapter  two  will  be  a  review  of  the  relevant  international  treaties  and  trade 
agreements  relevant  the  central  point  of  this mini-thesis  namely  the  
abolishment  of  export  subsidies  by  the EU. The  relevant   sources  in  this  
instance  will  relate  to  the  EU  treaties  such  as  the  CAP  and the  TDCA  as  
well  as  relevant  WTO  agreements. This  chapter  will  generally  be  an  
exposition  on  the  definition  and  scope  of  which  EU  support  programmes  
amount  to  export  subsidies. 
 
Chapter  three  focuses  on  the  impact  the  European  Union’s  agricultural  
policies  has  had  on  the  South African  agriculture  sector.  In  this  respect  the  
focus  of  research  will  mainly  be  on  South  Africa’s  sugar  industry.. 
 
Chapter  four  will be  a  discussion  and  evaluation  of  the  various  arguments  
put  forward  by the  proponents  as  well  as  the  opponents  to  the  European  
Union’s  policy  of  providing  export  subsidies  to  the  agricultural  producers. 
Are  the  EU’s  current  policies  and  support programmes  beneficial  to  
developing  nations  such  as  South  Africa  or are  these  very same  policies  and  
programmes  a burden  for  these  nations  as  well  as  the  citizens  of the 
European  Union? 
 
Chapter five  will  be  the  concluding  chapter. I will put  forward  my  reasons  
for  the  abolishment  of  the  system  of  export  subsidies  within  a  multilateral  
world  trading  system. Chapter five  will  be  a  an  evaluation  and  conclusion  
on  the  work  set  out  in  the  paper.     
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1.INTRODUCTION 
This  chapter  will  primarily  be  an  exposition  of the  relevant  multilateral trade  
agreements  which  are relevant  to the  issue  over  the  use  of  export subsidies  when  
it comes  to  agricultural products. This  will  be  relevant  to exploring  the  main  issue  
of  this  thesis, namely  how  Europe’s  agricultural  policies  impact  on  the  South  
African  agricultural sector. In  this  regard  I  will  be  focusing  on  the  agreements  
related  to  the  World Trade  Organisation (WTO), European Union (EU)  and South  
Africa. The  relevant  agreements  are: the  WTO Agreement  on  Agriculture, the  
Agreement  on  Subsidies  and  Countervailing  Measures(SCM), the  EU’s Common  
Agricultural Policy  as  well  as  the  trade  agreements  concluded  by  the  EU  and  
South  Africa, namely  the  Trade  and  Development  Cooperation  Agreement (TDCA). 
 
The  use  of  export  subsidies    has  always  been  a  highly  contentious  issue  in  
international  trade  circles.  From  the  development  of  the  GATT  Agreement  of  
1947 and  the  1955  GATT  amendments  to  the  present  day, this was an  issue  which  
was  guaranteed  to  cause  much  controversy  when  it  came  to  negotiations  related  
to  trade  agreements. The  use  of  export  subsidies  in  the  agricultural  sector  seems  
to  be  especially  controversial  with  equal  amounts  of  opponents  and  proponents 
who  are  vociferous  and  determined  in  their  support  or  opposition  to  the  use  of  
export  subsidies. 
“ Agricultural  sector…is  the  most  heavily  subsidised  sector  in  almost  all  
countries  that  are  capable  of  doing  so. This  is  not  simply  accidental.”1 
The  use  of  export  subsidies  was  for  many  years  if  not  expressly condoned, tacitly  
allowed  especially  by  the  industrialised  states. In  public a great show  was  made 
over the  use of  export  subsidies; i.e. that  they  should  be  limited  and  prohibited. 
                                                 
1 Desta M, The  Law  of  International  Trade  in Agricultural  Products: From  GATT  1947  to  the  WTO  Agreement  
on  Agriculture, p100 
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Nevertheless  developed  states  continued  to  support  their local  industries  and  
producers  through  the use  of  export  subsidy  programmes. 
 
The  international  trade  rules  and  principles  that  were   supposed  to  govern  the  use  
of   export  subsidies  were  weak  and  ineffective  in  preventing  this  trade  distorting  
practice. 
“The  principle  of  free  trade  requires  that  such  market  distorting  measures  such  
as  tariffs  and  non-tariff  barriers  be  eliminated  or  at  least  minimised…the  use  
of  subsidies  simply  destroys  the  benefits  that  could  otherwise   accrue  from  
such  moves. That  is  why  the practice  of  subsidies  just like  that  of  dumping  is  
labelled  as  one  of  the  so called  ‘unfair  trade  practices’…”2 
With  the  process  of  negotiations  underway at  the WTO  Uruguay  Round (1986-
1994), countries  realised  the  importance  of  setting  up  an international  framework  
in  order  to  govern  the  use  of  export  subsidies. 
“ …brief summary  of  Uruguay  Round negotiations…in  the  specific  area  of  
export subsidies  demonstrates  that  agriculture  in  general  and  agricultural  export  
subsidies  in  particular, held  the  key  to  the  success  or  failure  of  Round”3 
The  Agreement  on  Agriculture  was  the  end  result  of  this  need  for  an  
international  framework. One  of  the  main  aims  of  this  multilateral  agreement  is  
set  out  in  its  preamble: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Desta M, The  Law  of  International  Trade  in  Agricultural  Products: From  GATT 1947  to  the  WTO  Agreement  
on  Agriculture, p103 
3 Supra p 211-212 
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“Members, Having decided  to  establish  a basis for initiating  a process  of  reform  
of  trade  in  agriculture…committed  to  achieving  specific  binding  commitments 
in  each  of  the  following  areas: market access, domestic  support, export  
competition…”  4 
With  the introduction  of  the  Agreement  on  Agriculture, Member  States  undertook  
to  take  concrete  steps  towards  a  reduction  in  the  levels  of   export  subsidies  
utilised. This  turn  of  events  would  mean  a  significant  change  in  agricultural   
policy  for many  states  including the United  States, OECD( Organisation  for  
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development)states, developing  countries as  well  as  
various  other  member  blocs( e.g. Cairns Group) 
However  for  one  member  of  the  WTO, this  change  in  sentiment  regarding  export 
subsidies in  the  agricultural  sphere  was  particularly  hard to  adapt to due  to  its  
internal  policies  and  regulations. In  the  European  Community  (and  later  the 
European  Union), agricultural  policy  is  directed  by  the  Common  Agricultural  
Policy ( CAP) framework.  Agriculture  is  one  of  only  two  economic  sectors ( the  
other  being  transport) where  the  European Union  exercises  full  sovereignty  over  
decision  making and  a common  policy  exists. With  its  origins  in  1962, the  CAP  
was  originally  aimed  at  ensuring  Europe’s  food  security  and  that  Europe  would    
become  self-reliant  in  the  agricultural sector. 
“The  CAP’s  main  instruments  include  agricultural  price  supports, direct  
payments  to  farmers, supply  controls  and  border  measures.”5 
 
However  the  CAP  dream  has  turned  into  a nightmare not  just  for the  Brussels  
bureaucrats, but  also  for  the  citizens  of  Europe  and  nations  around  the  world  
especially  developing  and  Least  Developed  Countries (LDC).  
                                                 
4 World Trade Organisation: Results of  the Uruguay Round  of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Agreement  on  
Agriculture, p33 
5 www. ers.usda.gov, European Union :Policy: Common Agricultural Policy (accessed  on  8  August 2007) 
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By implementing various  measures  and   policies , particularly  in  relation  to  the  
export  of  agricultural  surpluses, the  EU  has  caused  significant  distortions  in  
international trade. 
 
In  this  chapter  I  shall  be  highlighting  how  the  whole  system  of  export  
subsidisation   operates  within  the  CAP  framework. I  will  also  be  reviewing  the  
WTO  Agreement  on  Agriculture  to  see  how  it  aims  to  reduce  and  eventually  
eliminate  the  use  of  export  subsidies  for  agricultural  products. 
 
 
2.WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION: AGREEMENT  ON  
AGRICULTURE 
The Agreement  on Agriculture  represents  a significant  step  in  the  gradual  reduction  
in  the  use of  export  subsidies. The agreement  tackles  the  issue over  the  use  of  
export  subsidies  within  the  agricultural  sector.  Along  with  measures  such  as  high  
tariffs  and  domestic  support, the use  of  export  subsidies  is  regarded  as  quite  a 
significant  trade  distorting   measure. 
“Although  most countries  wanted  to see  them  eliminated  as  being  the  most  
trade  distorting form  of  support, others  believed  that  they  were  necessary  as  
long  as  world  and  internal  prices   continued  to  diverge.”6 
This  statement  by Art  De  Zeeuw, chairperson  of  the  negotiating  group  on  
agriculture  at  the  Uruguay  Round, reflects  the  division in  opinion  which  existed  in  
world  trade  circles prior to  the  implementation  of  the  AoA. Therefore  there  was  a  
strong  need  to  have  a  central  regulatory  framework  in  order  to  effectively  
discipline  the  use  of  export  subsidies.  
                                                 
6 Desta  M, The  Law  of  International  Trade  in  Agricultural  Products… p209 
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This  need  for  a  regulatory  framework  was  especially  important  when  it  came  to 
the  export  of  agricultural surpluses  onto  the  world  market. 
“Once  again, the  EC made  specific  offers  in  all  other areas  of  agricultural  trade  
except  on  export subsidies…”7 
Even  at  the  negotiation  stage  of  the  Agreement  on  Agriculture,  the  EC( and  later  
the  EU) was  cast  as  the  villain  in  the  piece  due  to  its  policies  allowing  excessive  
use  of  export  subsidies  in  order  to  offload  agricultural  surpluses. Europe’s  
reputation  would  not  change  much  at  subsequent  WTO  negotiation  rounds 
“…perhaps  no  GATT  contracting  party  had  engaged  in  subsidies  as  elaborate  
or  extensive  as  those  created  over  the  years  by  Europe’s Common  Agricultural 
Policy.”  8 
3.DEFINITIONS  WITHIN  THE  AGREEMENT  ON  AGRICULTURE 
The  first  stop in  the  regulation  of export  subsidies  is  the  definition  of  what  
actually  amounts  to  an  export  subsidy.  The  Agreement  on  Agriculture  defines  it  
as  follows: 
“…refers  to  subsidies  contingent  upon  export  performance, including  the  export  
subsidies  listed  in  Article  9  of  this  Agreement.”9 
So  not  only  are  these  subsidies  that  are  contingent  upon  export  performance, but  
in  an  attempt  to  prevent  the  circumvention  of  the  agreement’s  guidelines, the  
drafters  of  the  agreement  have  also  included  a  further  category  of  subsidies  and  
supports  which  qualify  as  export  subsidies. What  we  have  here  is  an  attempt  to  
cast  a  wide  net  so  as to  prevent    possible  loopholes  in  the  framework, because  as  
past  incidents  have  proven, Member  States  especially  developed  states, are  quite  
adept  at   exploiting  loopholes  in  order  to  circumvent  the  regulations  of  the 
multilateral  agreement. 
                                                 
7 Supra p210 
8 Dillon S, International Trade and  Economic  Law  and  the  European  Union, p 176 
9 Agreement  on  Agriculture, Part  1, Article 1(e) 
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 To  cite  a  current  example  to  serve  as  an  illustration: the  provision  food  aid, 
especially  by  developed  countries. At  first  glance  the  provision  of  food  aid  would  
seem  a  worthy  thing  to  do, but  then  again  how  do  you  distinguish  between  
actual food  aid  and  simply  an  attempt  by  a country to  get  rid  of  his  excess  food  
surpluses? 
“The  distinction  between  food  aid  to  overcome  crises  and  hardship, which  may  
be  termed  bona  fide  food  aid  and  a  situation  where  quantities are  provided  
effectively  as  export  subsidies…can  be very  blurred.”10 
Article  9  of  the  AoA  is  the relevant  article  since  it  is  the  one  that  sets  out  the  
subsidy  and  support  programmes  which are  subject to  reduction  commitments. 
What  are these  reduction  commitments? These  are  the  commitments  made  by  the  
Member States  to  reduce  the  levels  of   export  subsidies  they  use  for  certain  
economic sectors and  products. The  period  from  1986  to 1990  was used  to  calculate  
the  base  period  necessary  to  calculate  these  reduction  commitments. 
“In  the first half  of the 1980’s, US  and EU  agricultural  support  was provided  
primarily  through  price  support  backed  by public  stockholding  policies. These  
policies…resulted  in  huge  surpluses, with  governments  becoming  purchasers of  
last  resort. In  the  second  half  of  the 1980’s, these  surpluses  were  systematically  
moved  onto  world  markets  with  the  aid  of  subsidies.” 11 
Therefore  the  period between  1986  and  1990  was  justified  in  being  used  as  the  
base  period. This  was  the  period  when  the  use  of  export  subsidies was  at  its  
highest. Consequently  Member  States  have  to  ensure  that  their  levels  of  support  
through  export  subsidies  does  not  exceed  the  limits  imposed  by  their  
commitments in terms  of  Article 8 as  well  as  taking  steps  to  eventually  reducing  
their  use  of  export subsidies  from  the  peak  levels  of  the  1986-1990  base  period. 
                                                 
10 Andrews N et al, Agriculture  in  the  Doha  Round, p26 
11 Andrews N et al, Agriculture in  the  Doha  Round, p28 
 
 
 
 
 12
 
As  stated  previously,  Article  9  opts  for  a  wider  interpretation  of  what  is  
considered  to  be  a  export  subsidy. These  include: 
• Article 9 (1)(a)- Direct  Subsidies  
• Article 9(1)(b)- Sales for  the  export  market  at  prices  lower  than  the  domestic               
market  price. 
• Article  9 (1) (c) – Payments  directly  or  indirectly  from  a  public  body  or agency  
for  the  export  of  agricultural  products. 
• Article 9 (1) (d) –Payments  of  subsidies  in  order  to  reduce  the  costs  of  
marketing  agricultural  products  destined  for  the  export  market. 
• Article 9 (1) (e) – Subsidisation  of  the  transport  costs  associated  with  the  export  
of  agricultural  products.  
• Article 9(1) (f) – “ Upstream Subsidies”: in  this  instance  payments  are  made  on  
agricultural  products that  are  incorporated  at  a  later  stage  into  other  products  that  
will  be  exported. 
It  is important  to  bear  in  mind  two  important  considerations  when  reviewing  these  
articles  of the  AoA. First  that  these  payment  and  subsidies  all  have  to  originate  
from a public  institution  and  body. If  the  institution  in  question  is  involved  in  the  
exercise  of  public  power  or  authority ,then  the  institution  will inevitably  fall  under  
the  scope  of  the  scope  of  the  Agreement  on  Agriculture. Secondly  in  the  instance  
of  subsidies  related  to  marketing,  transportation  costs or  export credits, these  are  
subsidies  which  are  provided  at  a rate  substantially  lower  than  what  is  available  
in  the  normal  commercial  market. 
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“ subsidy…a case  that  can  only  take  place  if  the  transfer is  made  for  less  than  
full  consideration  on  a comparable  commercial  benchmark. Just  like  a monetary  
payment  in  as  long  as  the  recipient  pays  the  market  price  for  whatever  he  
receives  in  kind, there is  no  subsidy.”    12 
 
Article  10  is  attempt  by  the drafters  of  the  agreement  to  plug  any  gaps  which  
may   be  exploited  by  certain  Member  States. As  the  heading  of  Article  10  states:  
“Prevention  of  Circumvention  of  Export  Subsidy  Commitments.”   Article  10  is  
utilised  in  order  to  regulate  the  use  of : 
I.Export  Credits 
II.Export  Credit  Guarantees 
III.Insurance  Programmes 
 
Article  10  also  establishes guidelines  for  the provision  of food aid  by  donor  
countries- Article  10 (4) (a-c). All  these  regulations  are  a  means  of  ensuring  that  
the  guidelines  and  regulations  set  up  by  Article  9  are  not  made  redundant  and   
ineffectual  by  countries  simply  exploiting  loopholes  and  bypassing  the  regulations. 
 
Export  credits  is  one  particular  form  of  subsidy  that is  being  utilised  with  
increasing  frequency. Although  it  is  not  in  the  form  of  a  direct  subsidy  paid  by  a 
public  institution, the  provision  of  export  credits nevertheless  have  the  potential  to  
lead  to  distortions  in  international trade. Within  the  agricultural  sphere, it  provides  
farmers  and  agribusiness  corporations  with  a  means  of  disposing  of  agricultural  
surpluses  as  a result  of  stimulated  overproduction 
                                                 
12 Desta M, The  Law  of  International  Trade  in  Agricultural Products…, p226 
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“…export  credits  reduce  the  cost  of  exporting, thereby  providing  greater  
incentives  to  export  rather  than  to  sell  the  quantities  domestically. 
Governments  can  intervene  to  provide  credit  for exporters  where it  is  
considered  to  be  in  the  national  interest…and/or  where  commercial  credit  is  
not  forthcoming.”13 
 
The  reasoning  behind  inserting  a  clause  in  the  Agreement  on Agriculture dealing  
with  the possible  circumvention  of  export  subsidy  commitments  is reflected  in  this  
quote: 
“ There  is  always  a risk  that  if  WTO  agreements  provide  effective  disciplines  
that  reduce  direct  export  subsidies, some  countries  will turn  increasingly  to  the 
extension  of  food  aid  programmes  and  concessional  export  credits  as  
substitutes for  direct  export  subsidies”14 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  although it  has  been  widely  accepted  that  export  
subsidies  are  trade  distorting  measures and  the  Agreement  on  Agriculture  has  
called  on  significant  reductions  in  the  use  of  these  subsidies, the  Agreement  still  
permits  countries  to  make  use  of  export  subsidies. 
“…makes  it  clear  that  members  are  not precluded  from providing  export 
subsidies, they  only need to  be  in  conformity  with  the rules of  the  Agreement  
and  their  respective Schedules of  Commitments.”  15 
And  further: 
“The obligation to  respect  the  reduction  commitments  each  Member  
incorporates  into  its  Schedule  constitutes  the  condition  for  the  lawful  use  of  
the  practices  enumerated  under  this  provision.”16 
                                                 
13 Andrews N  et al, Agriculture  in  the  Doha  Round, p26 
14 Supra p27 
15 Desta M, The  Law  of  International  Trade in  Agricultural  Products…,p 231 
16 Supra…,p231 para 
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4.THE  ISSUE  OVER  LISTED  AND  NON-LISTED  EXPORT  SUBSIDIES IN  
RELATION  TO  THE  AGREEMENT  ON  AGRICULTURE 
Member  states  of  the  Agreement  have an  opportunity  to  list  the  specific  
agricultural  products  that  will  be  subject  to  export  subsidy  reduction  commitments 
in  their  Schedules. Article  3(3)  of  the  Agreement   imposes  further  restrictions in  
that  the  possible  categories  of permissible  export  subsidies  is  limited. 
“ Subject to  the provisions  of  paragraphs  2(b) and  4  of  Article  9, a  Member  
shall  not  provide  export  subsidies…in  respect  of  the  agricultural  products  or  
groups  specified  in  Section  II of  Part  IV  of  its Schedule  in  excess  of  the  
budgetary outlay  and quantity  commitment  levels  specified  therein  and  shall  not  
provide such  subsidies  in  respect  of  any agricultural  product  not  specified  in  
that  Section  of  its  Schedule.”   17 
 
These  export  subsidies  are  regarded  as  being  listed  and  hence  it  is  still  
permissible  to use  them ( according  to the Agreement  on  Agriculture), provided that  
the  Member  State  utilises  them  in  the  manner  envisaged  in  Article  9. 
 
Article 10,as  already  stated  is  aimed  at ensuring  that  there is  no  circumvention  of  
the  reduction  commitments.  Therefore  it  lists  support  programs, which  although  
not  expressly  stated  in  the  reduction  commitments, they  nevertheless  have  the  
potential  to  be  trade  distorting  measures. It is  an  attempt  at  ensuring  all  the  bases  
are  covered. 
                                                 
17 WTO, The  Legal  Texts:   Agreement on  Agriculture, Article 3(3) ,p35 
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“…The  whole  purpose  of  Article  10 is  to  prevent  circumvention  of  the  export  
subsidy  commitments  resulting  from  Article  3, 8 and  9  of  the  Agreement on  
Agriculture  by  resorting  to  non-listed  export subsidies.”18 
And  further: 
“…the  commitment  not  to  exceed  the  scheduled  export  subsidy  reduction  
levels  with  respect to  specified  agricultural  products  and  the  commitment  not  
to  provide  listed  export  subsidies  on  non-specified  products.” 19 
To  sum  up: 
(1)Member  states  are  permitted to  provide  listed  export  subsidies  on  specified 
agricultural  products i.e. those  products  listed  in  their  commitment  Schedules, 
provided they  do not  exceed  their  reduction  commitment  levels. 
(2)Member  states  are  permitted  to  provide  non-listed  export  subsidies i.e. those 
referred  to  in Article 10  on  the  condition  that  they are  not  utilised  in  a manner  
which  would  lead  to  a circumvention  of  their  reduction  commitments. 
(3)Member  states are  expressly  prohibited  from  utilising  non-listed  export  subsidies  
in  order  to  subsidise  non-specified agricultural  products i.e. agricultural  products  
which  are  not  listed  in  their  Schedules. 
 
5.FINAL  THOUGHTS ON  THE  AGRICULTURE  AGREEMENT 
The  Agreement  on  Agriculture  is  a  worthy  attempt  at  introducing  a  framework  to  
regulate  certain aspects  of  the  international  trade  in  agricultural products. The  
Agreement  makes credible  strides  in  not  only  regulating  issues  such  as  market  
access  and  domestic  support but  also  focuses  on  the  need  to  be  aware  of  the  
historical  difficulties  facing developing  and  least  developing  countries.  
                                                 
18 Desta M, The  Law of  International  Trade  in  Agricultural  Products…, p235 
19 Supra…p237 
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By  raising  this  awareness  on  the  challenges faced  by developing nations et al , 
developed  nations  can  assist   certain  vulnerable developing  nations  through 
principles  such  as  special  and  differential  treatment  when  concluding  multilateral  
trade  agreements. This  is  particularly  important  if  one  considers  the  significant  
role  played  by  agriculture in  certain  Least  Developed Countries. 
 
However  I  am  of  the  belief  that  the  Agreement  on  Agriculture  does  not  go  far  
enough  in  its  stated  objectives. Although  its rules  regarding  export  subsidies  
represents  a significant  improvement  to that  of   prior  attempts  at  regulating  export  
subsidies, I  don’t  think  the  rules  are  effective  enough. Countries  continue  to  make  
use  of  export  subsidies. Even if  they  follow  the  guidelines  of  the  Agreement  to 
the  letter, the  fact  is  that  these export  subsidies still  result  in  major  trade  
distortions( as  I  will  show, when I  review  the  EU’s  policies)  and  the possibility  
exists  that  countries  may  nevertheless  persist  in  their  attempts  to  circumvent  
Article 10. 
 
6.THE COMMON  AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
Originating  in  1962, Europe’s CAP  has  had  its  fair  share  of  ups  and  downs. 
Originally  set  up  in  order  to  ensure Europe’s  food  security, the  CAP  was  
premised  on   three  main  objectives: 
(1)A  unified  market  in  which  there  is  a  free  flow  of  agricultural  commodities  
within  the  EU; 
(2)Product  preference  in  the  internal market  over foreign  imports  through  
common  customs  tariffs; and 
(3)Financial  solidarity  through  common  financing  of  agricultural  programs20. 
                                                 
20 www.ers.usda.gov, European Union: Policy: Common  Agricultural  Policy (accessed on  23 August  2007) 
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The  CAP  represents  a quite  enigmatic  program. On  the  one  hand  it  has  resulted  
in  Europe  no  longer  being  dependent  on  agricultural  food  imports. In  fact  the  EU  
is  a  leading  exporter  of  certain  agricultural  products  onto  the  world  market. As  a  
result  of  CAP, Europe’s food  security  is secured  and  shortages  of  basic  foodstuffs  
are  the  stuff  of  legend. The  CAP  has  also  resulted  in  the  establishment  of  major  
agribusiness  corporations  which  compete  on  the  global  stage  further  strengthening  
globalisation. And  the  biggest  beneficiary  of  this  program?- well  of  course  the  
humble  farmer. As  a result  of  CAP, the  livelihoods  of  thousands  of  farmers  have  
been   secured  and  has  eventually  lead  to  the  creation  of  a  class  of  middle to  
upper  income  farmers. 
Just  as  CAP  has  its  many  admirers, it  also  has  just  as  many  detractors. The  CAP  
is  the  second  biggest  consumer  of  the  EU’s  total  budget  with  the cost  being 
estimated  at  40 to  43  billion  euros. The  incentives  given  to  farmers  under  CAP, 
have  stimulated  them  to  overproduce  agricultural  products. This  of  course  leads  to  
surpluses, which  in  turn  incur  further  costs. This  overproduction  of  agricultural  
foodstuffs  created  the  notorious “mountains  and  lakes”  of  various  foodstuffs  in  the  
late  1970’s  and  1980’s. 
When  it comes  to  WTO  trade  negotiations,  agriculture  always  seems  to  be  a  
major  sticking  point,  with  the  European Union  and  its  CAP  always  being  accused  
as  the  major  reason  why  there  can  be  no  headway  in  negotiations  and  no  major  
reform. 
How  exactly  does  the  CAP operate? Well  the primary  instruments  that are  utilised  
include  direct  payments  made  to  farmers,  the  imposition  of  import  controls  and  
barriers  as  well  as  EU  assistance  in  the  export  of  agricultural  foodstuffs  namely  
the  use  of  export  subsidies.  In  this  instance  I  will  be  focusing  on  how  the  
program  of  export  subsidies  is  implemented  and  applied. 
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European  farmers  are  guaranteed  a  certain  price  for  whatever foodstuff  they  
produce.  This  is  known  as  the intervention  price. The  important  thing  about  the  
intervention  price  is  that  it  is  always  higher  than  the  world  market  price  for  the  
particular  foodstuff.  In  some  instances  the  intervention price  is  up  to  three  times  
higher  than  the  world  price. This  would  appear  to  be  quite  a  beneficial  system  
for  the  farmer.  Whatever  volume  of  crop  he  produces  year  in and  year  out,  he  is  
guaranteed  to  receive  the  same  price  every  year  which  is almost  always  higher  
than  the  world  price. So  even  if  he  has  had  a  bad  year, he  will be  able to  
generate  an  income.  Of  course  the  system  of  intervention  prices  has  lead   
European  farmers  to  overproduce  resulting  in  surpluses. 
“Farmers  are  guaranteed intervention  prices  for unlimited  quantities  of  eligible  
agricultural  products. This  means  that  the  EU  authorities  will purchase, at  the  
intervention  price  unlimited  excess  products…that  cannot  be  sold  on  the  
market. The  surplus  commodities  are  then  put  into  EU  storage  facilities  or  
exported  with  subsidy.”         21 
 
 
As  stated  these  surpluses  have  to  be  eliminated  somehow  and  one  of  the  
measures  applied  in  terms  of  CAP  in  this  regard  is  the  provision  of export  
subsidies 
“ Export  subsidies  are…used  to  maintain internal  prices  at  above  world  market  
levels  and  to  transfer  domestic  surplus  supplies  onto  the  world  market. While  
they  are  designed  to  support  internal  market  prices  in  the  countries  applying  
them, they  also  affect  world  markets  by  increasing  export  supplies.”  22 
                                                 
21 www.ers.usda.gov, European  Union: Policy: Common  Agricultural  Policy (accessed on  23  August  2007) 
22 Andrews  N, Agriculture  in the  Doha  Round, p26 
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Export  subsidies  allow  farmers  to  get  rid  of  their  surplus  produce  by  exporting  
them. The  provision  of  these subsidies  obviously  serve  as  an  incentive  to  
overproduce. The  farmer  would  prefer  to  direct  his production  towards  the  export  
market  because  whatever  he  cannot  sell  on  the  domestic  market,  he  can  simply  
ship  off the  surplus  and  still  receive  a  monetary  reward  for  it. Herein  lays  the  
flaw  in  the  program. Production  is increasingly  focused  on  the  export  market.  As  
a  result  this  has  a negative  impact  on  the  available  supplies  within  the  domestic  
market. Therefore  the  simple  economics equation  of  supply  and  demand  dictates  
that   if  there  is  a limited  supply  of  agricultural  products, then  there  will  be  an  
increase  in  the  price  of  the  product  due  to its  demand. 
“Export  subsidies  are  incentives  to  exporters  that  encourage  them  to  export  
products  rather  than  to  sell  them  domestically. They  reduce  internal  market  
supplies, which  results  in  increased  market  prices.”        23 
 
In  the  context  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy, the  citizens  of  Europe  are  
paying  doubly  for  the  continued  implementation  of   the  export  subsidy  policies. 
Firstly  they have  to pay  high  prices  for  foodstuffs  as  a result  of  production  being  
focused  on  the  export  market  and  the  imposition  of  high  tariff  barriers. Secondly  
the  citizens  of  the  EU  eventually  have   to  foot  the  bill  for  the  continued  use  of  
export  subsidies. In  the  2002 to  2003  period  the  estimated  expenditure  on  export  
subsidies  amounted to  1.3  billion  euros. 
“One effect  of  the  CAP  has been  to  keep  overall  food  prices  relatively  high  
for  EU consumers…Despite  price  reductions  food  is  still  more  expensive  in  
the  EU  than  in  the  United  States  and  EU  consumers spend  a larger  share  of  
their  income  on  food  and  alcoholic  beverages  than  their  U.S. counterparts.”24 
                                                 
23 Supra…p27 
24 www.ers.usda.gov, European  Union: Policy: Common  Agricultural  Policy (accessed  on  23  August  2007)  
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Not  only  does  the  continued use  of  export subsidies  have  an  impact  on  the  
average  European’s  pocket, but  also  on  some poor  farmer  living  in  one  of  the 
countless  third  world  countries. In  most  developing  nations  and  all  Least  
Developed  Countries, agriculture  makes  a  significant  if  not  crucial  contribution  to  
the particular country’s  Gross  Domestic  Product (GDP). For  these  states  the  
agriculture  sector  represents  the  only  realistic  opportunity  of  generating  revenue  
besides  taxes. The  agriculture  sector  allows  these  nations  to  compete  with  
industrialised  nations because  in most  instances  the  domestic  producers  in  these 
countries  are  able  to  produce  agricultural  products  at  a   cheaper  rate  than  their  
counterparts  in  developed  countries. Therefore  farmers  in  developing  countries  and  
Least Developed Countries  face  attack  on  two  fronts: firstly  they  can  only just  
compete  against  heavily  subsidised  agricultural exports  from  the EU. These  
subsidised exports  are  significantly  cheaper  than  the  available  domestic  products. 
Secondly, if  an  agricultural  producer  does  manage  to  expand  sufficiently  enough  
to  export  to  the  EU, the  producer  would  face  a  further  obstacle in the form  of  
high  import  barriers  imposed  by the  European  Union. 
“ In  terms  of  its  relative  position, the  EU   gives  relatively  high  protection to  
agriculture  compared  with  the  rest  of  the  OECD( Organisation  for  Economic  
Cooperation and Development) group  and  appears  to  offer  greater  support  to  its  
farmers  than  do  many  other  countries. Moreover  in  terms  of  explicit  export  
subsidies, it  accounts  for  nearly  90%  of  all  such  support…”    25 
 
 
                                                 
25 Milner C, Agricultural  export   subsidies  and  Developing  Countries  interests, p13 
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In  this  thesis  I  am  advocating  for  the  total  prohibition  on  the  use  of  export  
subsidies  as  means  of   preventing  distortions  within  the  sphere  of  agricultural  
trade. However  I  have  come  to  realise  that  certain  measures  imposed  together  
with  export  subsidies  lead  to  a  distorted  world  trade  market. These   measures  are  
specifically  related  to  high  import  barriers that  are  imposed. The  EU  is  particularly  
fond of  this  measure. In  order  to  sustain  the  high  prices   and subsidies  they  pay  to  
the  farmers, the  EU  has  to  ensure  that  the  price  of  foodstuffs  remains  high  within  
the  Union.  To  achieve  this,  import  barriers  are  extended  making  it  very  difficult  
for  food  exports  from  other  states  to  compete  with  domestically  produced  
foodstuffs. Therefore  local   producers  are  able  to  keep  their  prices  high, safe  in  
the  knowledge  that  do  not  have  to  fear  the  competition  from  international  
producers 
 
“ Where  comprehensive  support  arrangements  involving  export  subsidies  along  
with  other  measures  exist, export  subsidies  may  not  be considered  separately  as  
a market  distorting  form  of  support   so  much  as  an  integral  part  of  a system  
of  distorting  support.” 26 
 
It  would  appear  that  it  would  not  be  sufficient  just  to  tackle  the  issue  of  export  
subsidies  as  a whole  but  the  whole  EU  system  that  is  used  to  protect  its  farmers  
and  agricultural  sector.  However  this  issue  is  quite  a  hot  topic  within  Europe,  
with  important  social, economic  as  well  political  issues  to  be  considered. 
Whenever  possible  reforms  of  the  CAP  and  its  associated  policies  is  proposed, it  
almost  always  generates  a flurry  of  debate. 
                                                 
26 Andrews N, Agriculture in the  Doha  Round, p26 
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 Almost  always  we have  either  French  farmers  staging  protests  and  causing  
general  mayhem,  claiming  that  proposed  reforms  will  harm  their  livelihoods  and  
“way  of  life” or  we  have  vocal  NGO’s  asking  for  drastic  cuts  in  farm  spending  
and  clamouring  for  more  debt  relief  for  the  poorest  countries. 
 
“ Because  of  the  interactions  of  the  various  forms  of  support  and  the  ability  
to  substitute  the  various  forms  of  support  for  each  other, reducing  export  
subsidies  does not  necessarily  reduce  overall  levels  of  assistance  or  market  
distortion.”    27 
However  at  this  stage  of  its  development, I  do not  think  that  the European  Union  
is  ready  or  prepared  to  opt  for  a  radical  overhaul  of  its  agricultural  policy. 
Therefore  I  believe  that  the  current  process  of  gradual  reform  of  the  Common  
Agricultural  Policy  is  the  correct  one  in  certain  respects 
 
Starting  of  with  the  MacSharry  reforms  of  1992 ( the  last  major  reform  process  
was  in  2003), most  of  the  reforms  have  been  centred  around  the  issues  of  market  
access and  domestic  support.  The  EU  has  made  some  credible  reforms  in these 
areas  such  as  the  EBA  initiative( Everything  But  Arms), allowing  imports  from  
certain  developing  and  least  developed  nations  free  access  into  the  European  
market.  On  the  domestic  support  front, the  process  of  decoupling  was  
implemented. Payments  to  farmers  were  no  longer  associated with  how  much  they  
produced  or  their  production  levels  but  instead  received  direct  payments  related  to  
rural  development. 
“ …feature  of  the  2003  reforms  is the  move  from  a price  support  policy  to  an  
income  support  policy  through  decoupled  payments.”28 
                                                 
27 Andrews N, Agriculture  in  the  Doha  Round, p26 
28 www.ers.usda.gov, European Union: Policy: Common Agricultural  Policy (accessed  on 23  August 2007)  
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“…Mr  Fischler  emphasised  the  need  to  respond  to  growing  public  concern  
and  was  anxious  to  underline  that  the  reform  did  not  mean  the  end  of  
support  for  agriculture  but  a  better  protection  of  public  goods  and  a 
simplification  of  the  policy  for  farmers”29 
And  further: 
“The  CAP  of  2006  is  therefore  profoundly  different  from  the  CAP of   1984  
or  even  1991: customs  duties  have  been  dropped: 80% of  the  budget  goes   to  
direct  aid  rather  than  to  export  subsidies  or  market  procurement…”30 
 
However  when it  comes  to  the  issue  of  export  subsidies, the  European  Union  
seems  quite  hesitant  to  commit  to  significant  reforms  or  reductions.  The  fact  that  
the  EU  accounts  for  90%  of  all  agricultural  export  subsidies  utilised  in  the  world  
does  not  seem  to  bother  the  powers  that  be  in  Brussels  or  Strasbourg. 
“ While  the  US  and  the  EU  and  a  number  of other  countries  have  significant  
allowances  for  export  subsidies, for  most  commodities  the  EU  remains  the  
only  major  user  of  export  subsidies.”31 
 
To  sum  up: 
The  European Union’s  Common  Agricultural  Policy  is  something  that   has  never  
been  attempted  before. What  it  has  achieved  over  the last  45  years  is  quite  
remarkable  if  you  consider  that  it  has  transformed  an  entire  continent  from  a  net  
importer  of  foodstuffs  into  the  second  largest  exporter  of  agricultural  products  
and  foodstuffs  in  the  world.  
 
                                                 
29 Garzon I , Reforming  the  Common  Agricultural Policy-History  of  a  Paradigm Change, p104 
30 www. diplomatie.gouv.fr, Agriculture: Common  Agricultural  Policy (accessed  on  23  August  2007)   
31 Andrews N , Agriculture  in the  Doha  Round, p30 
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However  CAP  has  since  the  1980’s  begun  to  show  signs  of  its  old  age. Policies  
that  have  worked  and  been  successful  in  the  1960’s  are  no  longer  so  in  the  21st  
century,  necessitating  urgent  reforms.  However  one  area  that  has  been  impervious  
to  these  reforms  appear  to  be  the  policy  of  export  subsidies. As  I  will  elaborate  
in further  chapters, export  subsidies  are  a  relic  of  the  past  which  is  not  
compatible  in  this  day  and  age  where  market  liberalisation, globalisation  and  
development  assistance  for  developing  and  least  developed  countries  are  the  major  
themes.       
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1.INTRODUCTION 
The  focus  of  this  chapter will  be  the  use  of  export  subsidies  in  relation  to  the  
European  Union’s  sugar  regime. As  stated  in  the  previous  chapter, Europe’s  
agricultural  policies  are  directed  by   the  Common  Agricultural  Policy. Therefore  it  
is  necessary  to  conduct  an  examination  of  the  mechanisms  employed   by  the  
CAP  with  reference  to  the  production  of  sugar. How  is it   possible  that  an  entity  
that  used  to  be  a net  importer  of  raw  sugar, has  now, in  the  space  of  two  
decades, transformed  itself  into  the  world’s  second  largest  exporter  of  sugar 
(second  only  to  Brazil)? I mean  France, the  UK, Sweden  and  other  northern  
European  countries   hardly  spring  to  mind  when  one  thinks  of  the  major  
producers  of  sugar,  which  is  essentially  a  crop  suited  to  tropical  climates.  How  
have  the  Europeans  achieved  this  dramatic  turnaround? 
 
I  believe  that  the  European  sugar  farmers  and  producers  have  tended  to  follow  a 
policy  of   overproduction, induced  by  the  various  CAP  support  measures  dangled  
in  front  of  them. Of  course  overproduction  leads  to  surpluses. These  surpluses  are  
inconsistent  with  the  EU  policy  of  maintaining  high  prices  for  certain  
commodities  within  the  domestic  market  and  therefore  have  to  be  eliminated. One  
way  is  the   granting  of  export  subsidies, enabling  European  producers  to  offload  
their  excess  supply  onto  the  world  markets. 
In  this  chapter  I  will  be  examining  the  operation  of  the  CAP  measures  within  
the  sugar  sector. These  measures  relate  to  the  different  categories  of  quotas  
concerning  the  production  of  sugar, how  these  quotas  are  applied  in  practice  and  
how  the  policy  of  export  subsidies  facilitates  the  offloading  of  excess   European  
sugar  onto  the  world  market. But  what  sort  of  an  impact  do  the  European  
policies  have  on  other  major  sugar  producers, who  are mostly  developing  and  
least  developed  countries. 
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 Sugar  represents  for  many  of  these  states, especially  the  least  developed  states, 
an  opportunity  to  earn  major  export  revenue. Sugar  is  one   of  the  few   
commodities  where  these  states  enjoy  a comparative  advantage  due  to  the  low 
cost  of  production  in  these  states. 
More  importantly, how  do  Europe’s  agricultural  policies  impact  on  the  South  
African  sugar  industry? Do  the  European  policies  and  measures  have  an  impact  
on  the  South  African  agricultural  sector  and  the  economy  as  a whole? If  
European agricultural  policies  do  have  an  impact  on  South  Africa,  are  they  
merely  limited  to  the  economic  sphere  or  do  they  have  relevant  social  
ramifications? These  are  the questions  I  will  attempt  to  answer  in  this  chapter.   
 
2.THE  EUROPEAN  UNION’S  SUGAR  REGIME 
Sugar  production  within  the  EU  appears  to  be an  issue  which  generates  equal  
measures  of  opposition  and  support. The  EU  has  undertaken  significant  reforms  
with  respect  to  other  agricultural  commodities,  yet  it  appears  when  it  comes  to  
sugar, the  pace  of  EU   reform  seems  quite  slow ( or  non-existent  if you ask  
certain  aid  agencies  and  developing  countries). However  the  European  Union  has  
come  under  increasing  pressure  at  WTO  negotiation  rounds  to  undertake  
significant  reforms  of  the  sugar  sector. 
“what  is  being  questioned  in  the  current  Sugar  Market  Order, inter  alia, is  the  
concentration  of  production, the  intensity  of  production, dumping  of  surpluses  
onto  world  markets  and  the  state-related  excessive  advantage  of  sugar  against  
other  European  crops.”    1 
 
 
                                                 
1 CIDSE-APRODEV, Position Paper: Reform  of  the  Sugar  Regime  in  the  European  Union, Policy  
Recommendations  from  a development  perspective, April 2005 
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With  the  World  Trade  Organisation (WTO)  moving  closer  to  its  goal  of  global  
trade  liberalisation, Europe  has  been  forced  to  rethink  the  use of  one  of  the  
pillars  of  the  CAP  system, namely  export  subsidies  with  regard  to  the  sugar  
sector. In  this  instance  it  has been  the  persistence  of  developing  states  which  has  
brought  about  this  rethink  in  EU  policy. 
 
No  longer  are  these  developing  countries  unable  to confront  the  major  sugar  
producers  over  their  use  of  export  subsidies. These  countries  have  organised  
themselves  into  equally  powerful  groupings  such  as  the  G-20  and  the  Cairns  
Croup. This  point  was  illustrated  in  2004, when  a  WTO  dispute  resolution  panel  
found  in  favour  of  Brazil’s  complaint  that  the  EU’s  use  of  export  subsidies  to  
offload  excess  sugar  resulted  in  significant  distortions  in  world  trade. Brazil,  
together  with  Thailand  and  Australia,  requested  a  panel  decision  in  terms  of the  
WTO’s  Dispute  Resolution.  The  European  Union  was  accused  of  exceeding  its  
reduction  commitments  with  regard  to  export  subsidies  in  terms  of  the  Agreement  
on  Agriculture. Brazil  accused  the  European  Union  of  cross-subsidising  2.7 million  
tonnes  of  its  ‘C’ quota  sugar  with  the  high  internal  prices  paid  for  the  ‘A’ and  
‘B’  quota  sugar. The  EU was  also  accused  of  using  sugar  imports  from  India  and  
African, Caribbean  and  Pacific (ACP)  countries, amounting  to  1.6  million  tonnes,  
as  a  way  of  bypassing  its  reduction  commitments. The  EU  was  accused  of  
providing  export  subsidies  in  the  re-export  of  the  ACP  and  Indian sugar  imports.   
“The  European  Union  sets  quotas  for  sugar  production  for  the  European  
market, and  farmers  must  export  any  surplus  sugar   at  lower  prices. In  its  
complaint, Brazil  accused  the  European  Union  of  exporting  more  subsidized  
sugar  than  is  allowed  under  global  trade  agreements.” 2 
                                                 
2 WTO  Says  EU  Sugar  Export  Subsidies  Are  Illegal, www. organicconsumers.org  (accessed  on  29  August  2007)   
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 A  senior  Brazilian  government  official, Mr Clodoaldo Hugueney, went  on  to  say  
that: 
“This  ruling, just  like  the  cotton  decision, confirms  that  there  are  immense  
distortions  in  international  agricultural  markets, and  it  also  confirms  that  
serious  negotiations  need  to  take  place  to  do  away  with  farm  subsidies, both   
for  export  and  domestic  consumption.”3 
 
It  would  appear  that  the  WTO  panel  decision  will eventually  pave  the  way  for  
the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  within  the  European  agriculture  sector.  
However  it  is  not  as  simple  as  that. When  billions  of  euros  worth  of  support  
payments  are  at  stake,  there  never  seems  to  be  a  simple  solution. The  presence  
of  various  interests  and  lobby  groups within  the  European  agriculture  sector  
makes  it  difficult  for  Brussels  to  undertake  any  worthwhile   reforms  of  its  
agricultural  policies  especially  in  relation  to  sugar. 
“Pascal Lamy  indicating  that  the  EU is  perfectly  entitled  to protect  its  local  
industries  by  these  measures…it  should  be borne  in  mind  that  Lamy  is  subject  
to  great  deal  of pressure  from  major  EU  sugar  producers and  processors.”4 
 
However  the  EU  Commission  has  undertaken  certain  reforms  of  its  sugar  regime  
in  response   in  2004  in  response  to  the  WTO panel  decision  and  growing  
dissatisfaction  of   other  sugar  exporting  states  and  significantly  the  European 
consumer. To  establish whether  these  reforms  are  worthwhile, I  will  firstly be  
reviewing the  status  quo  which  existed  prior  to  the  reforms, secondly the  reforms  
themselves and  lastly whether  or  not  these  reforms  have  achieved  their  desired  
outcomes. 
                                                 
3 Supra 
4 www.tralac.org , EU sugar  subsidies  hurting  South  Africa (accessed  on 28  July 2007)  
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3.THE  SWEET  TASTE  OF  SUCCESS: EUROPEAN  SUGAR  POLICY  IN  
TERMS  OF  THE  COMMON  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY 
As  stated, CAP  policies  have  transformed  the  European  Union  into  a  significant  
exporter  of  refined  sugar. This  system  has  been  underpinned  by  the  use  of  
production  quotas, the  high  levels  of  import  barriers  keeping  sugar  prices  within  
the  Union  high  and  the  use  of  export  subsidies  to  eliminate  sugar  surpluses. 
“The  EU  has  a highly  regulated  system  for  sugar  that  is  designed  to  provide  
substantial  support  for  domestic  producers. An  internal  support  
price…intervention  price  is  maintained  primarily  through  import  restriction  and  
the  subsidising  of  exports  to  prevent  excessive  stock  increases  as  producers  
and  consumers  respond  to  high  internal  prices.”  5 
 
The  CAP  policies  have  enabled  European  farmers  and  large  agri-corporations  to  
export  about  six  million  tonnes  of refined  sugar  annually. According  to  the  
OXFAM  report “Dumping  on the  World”, it  costs  the  EU  about  3.3  euros  to 
export  one  euro  worth  of  sugar. Clearly  the  current  policies in  place  appear  to  be  
quite  a drain  on  the  EU’s  financial  resources. 
 
4.PRODUCTION  QUOTAS  IN  THE  SUGAR  REGIME 
The  production  of  sugar  is  centred  around  the  three  different  categories  of  
quotas. The  ‘A’, ‘B’  and  ‘C’  quota  categories   each  have  their  own  characteristics  
and  specifications. 
“ Under  EU  sugar  regime,  the  volume  of  production  that  receives  price  
support  is  limited  by  a  quota  system.”6 
                                                 
5 Andrews N, Agriculture  in  the  Doha  Round, p79   
6 Andrews N, Agriculture in  the Doha  Round, p79 para 3 
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In  terms  of  the  quota  requirements: 
• ‘A’  quota:  this  is  the  flagship  production  quota  within  the  European  Union.  It  is  
also  the  largest  production  quota  of  three  with  production  of  sugar   capped  at  
about  11.89  million  tonnes (according  to  the  2001/2002 figures) 
• The  ‘B’  quota  is  significantly  smaller  than  the  ‘A’  quota,  with  the  production  of  
white  sugar  pegged  at  2.59  million  tonnes 
• The  use  and  application  of  the  ‘C’ production  quota  is  the  one  which  causes  the  
most  controversy  in  agricultural  trade  circles.  This  quota  relates  to  sugar   that  is  
produced  in  excess  of  the  ‘A’  and  ‘B’ quotas  and  is  therefore  unlimited. This  is  
the  quota  that is  closely  associated with  the  use  of  export  subsidies. This  
overproduced  sugar cannot  remain  within  the  domestic  EU  market  because  it  
would  lead  to  a depression  of  sugar  prices. Export  subsidies  are  provided  as  a  
further  form  of  compensation  to  EU  sugar   producers. Producers  offload  their  
surplus  sugar  supplies  onto  the  world  market.  World  prices  are  significantly  
lesser  than  EU  internal  prices. Export  subsidies  are  a way  of  making  up  that  
shortfall. 
“ The intervention  price  for  quota  sugar  is  supported  through  intervention  
arrangements  designed  to  provide  a  floor  to  the  internal  price  at  the  
administratively  set  intervention  price  plus  an  amount  to  cover  a storage  
levy.”7 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Supra… p 80 
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The  OXFAM  report, ‘Dumping  on  the  world’, indicates  that: 
“Effectively   all  non-quota  sugar produced  in  excess  of  the  quota  amounts, gets  
subsidised  and  is  then  sold  outside  of  the  EU, effectively  making  it  profitable  
to produce  sugar  in  excess  of  local needs  in  spite  of  the  massive  cost  of  
production  in  the  EU.”  8 
 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  even though  the  EU  is one  of  the  highest  cost  
producers  of  sugar, European  sugar producers  are  still  able  to  compete  effectively  
against  their  counterparts  in  Brazil, South Africa  and  the other major  sugar  
producers. In  fact  according to the  2004  OXFAM  report ‘Dumping  on  the World’, 
it  costs  the  major  EU sugar  producers  25  cents  to  produce  one  pound  of  white  
sugar. Compare  this  with  the  cost  of  production  of Brazilian  producers: 4 cents  per  
pound  or  their  Indian  counterparts, who  are  slightly  more  expensive  at  9  cents  
per  pound. It  does  not  make  economic  sense  that  a  producer  with  such  high  
costs  of  production  is  still  able  to  compete  with  their  low  cost  competitors. 
“Europe  is  one  of  the  highest  cost  producers  of  sugar. According to  a study  by  
the  Netherlands  Economic  Institute (NEI) the  production  costs  of  the  lowest  
cost  beet  producers  in  the  EU  were  60%  higher  than  the  costs  of low-cost  
cane…It  costs  Europe  around  673  euros  to   produce  one  tonne  of  white  sugar, 
compared  to  just  286  euros  for  competitive  countries  like  Brazil, Colombia, 
Malawi…”    9 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 www.tralac.org , EU  sugar  subsidies  hurting  South  Africa (accessed  on  28  July  2007) 
9 CIDSE-APRODEV Position Paper Reform  of  the  Sugar  Regime  in  the  European  Union, Policy  
Recommendations  from  a  development  perspective, April 2005 p4 
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The  fact  that  European  sugar  producers  are  still  able  to  compete  effectively  with  
their  overseas  rivals  is  all  based  on  the  support  the  industry  receives  through  
CAP  policies. Not  only  are  these  producers  supported  by  the  supra-national  EU 
Commission, but  also  by  various  Member  States  of  the  EU. 
 
Certain  large  agri-business  corporations  receive  national  grants  from  Member  
States. These  national  aid  packages  complement  what  the  sugar producers  already  
receive  under  CAP  policies. It would  appear  that  these  producers  are quite  weak -
look  at  all  the  support  they  receive! 
“Spanish  producers  are  the  largest  recipients  of  national  aid, although  it  is  also  
provided  to  some  producers  in  Finland, Ireland , Portugal and  the United 
Kingdom.”   10 
 
One  of  the significant  measures  employed  within  the  EU’s  sugar  regime  is  the  
use  of  export subsidies. The  cost  of  this  practice  amounts  to  between  1  billion  to  
1.3  billion  euros annually. EU support  for  the  sugar  industry  is  not  limited  to  
these  payments. 
“In  addition  to  the  1.3  billion euros  in export  subsidies  recorded  annually in  its  
budgets, the  EU  provides  hidden support  amounting  to  around  833 million  
euros  on  nominally  unsubsidised  sugar  exports. These  hidden  dumping  
subsidies reflect  the  gap  between  EU  production  costs  and  export  prices”    11 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Andrews N, Agriculture in the Doha  Round, p79 para 4 
11 www.seatini.org , Issue: Development, Cotton, Sugar, 30April-15May  2004 Volume 7  no 7, p6 
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5.MEASURES  UTILISED  TO  MAINTAIN  THE  STATUS  QUO AND  THEIR  
IMPACTS  ON  THE  GLOBAL  SUGAR  MARKET 
In  order  to  prop  up  their  local  sugar producers  against  foreign  competition, EU  
policy  is  directed at  two  main  measures: export  subsidies and  high  import  duties. 
By  utilising  export  subsidies, European  sugar  producers  are  able  to  get  rid  of  
their  surplus  supplies  and  the  high  import  duties  serve  as  an  effective  barrier  
against  cheaper  foreign  competitors  entering  the  EU  market,  thus  preserving  the  
artificially  high  prices  within  the  EU. This  whole  system  is  geared  towards  
supporting the average  EU  farmer. Even  though  agriculture  accounts  for  an  ever  
decreasing  economic  activity (i.e. about  2 to  4%  of  Europe’s  workforce  is  
involved  in  agriculture), it  nevertheless  consumes  quite  a  significant  proportion  of   
the  EU’s  budget. 
A  significant  result  of  the  EU’s  policy  of  export  subsidies  is  that  it  has  a  
negative  impact  on  the  global  market  price  for  the  particular  commodity.  This  is  
especially  so  when it  comes  to  sugar. The  cheap  European  sugar  is  offloaded  onto  
the  world  market. This  flooding  of  the  world  market  leads  to  a  depression  in  
prices. Overseas  competitors  especially  in  the  developing  world  struggle  to  
compete  against  these  subsidised  exports. Their  European rivals  are  able  to  
undercut  them  even  though  in  many  instances, particularly  in  the  case of  sugar, 
developing  country  producers  are  able  to  produce  more  cheaply  and  efficiently. 
“By  driving down  prices  and  dumping such  a  large  surplus  of  exports, the  EU  
sugar  regime  contributes  to  volatility  in  the  world  sugar  market. It  has  also  
contributed  to  the  downward  trend  of  global  sugar prices  since  1995. 
Developing countries  lose  foreign  exchange  earnings, markets  and  their  sugar  
producers  lose  valuable  revenue.12 
                                                 
12 CIDSE-APRODEV, Reform  of  the  Sugar  Regime  in the  EU- Policy  recommendations  from  a  developmental  
perspective, April  2005, p5 
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 The  most  recent  available  figures  relating  to  the  use  of  export subsidies  within  
CAP  is  definitely  food  for  thought.  In  the  2001  to  2002  financial  period, 1,493  
million  euros  was  paid  in  export  subsidies.  This  large  amount  was  used  to  export 
about  3,488,000 tonnes  of  sugar.  Bearing  in   mind  that  that  these  figures  only  
relate  to  the  sugar  sector, it  illustrates  the  scale  at  which  Europe’s  agricultural  
sector  operates. Not  surprisingly  developing  and  least  developed  nations  struggle  
to compete  with  EU  agricultural  produce  on  the  world  stage. 
 
In  the  sugar ‘game’ it  is  not  only  export  subsidies  which  assist  the  European  
producers. Import  tariffs work  in  tandem  with  the  export  subsidies, making  it  
almost  nigh  on  impossible  for  foreign  sugar   producers  to  compete  with  their 
European  rivals  in  the EU  market. 
“…the EU  slaps  on  a tariff  which  is so  high  that  it  becomes uncompetitive  for  
exporters  to  export  to  the  EU. The  current  tariff  stands  at  a whopping  
324%.”13 
And  further: 
“Countries  such as  Brazil, Thailand, US, South  Africa  and Australia  face  a  
prohibitively  high  entry  tariff  into the  EU( 33.90  euros  per  100kg  for  raw  
sugar  plus  permanently  applied  safeguard  duty  of  12.89  euros  per  100kg). 
while  there  are  arguments  about  the  exact  ad  valorem  equivalent, it  will 
certainly  amount  to  considerably  more  than  200%14 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 www.tralac.org , EU  sugar  subsidies  hurting South  Africa, (accessed  on  28  July  2007) 
14 Position  Paper  on  Sugar  and  the  Doha  Development  Round, American  Chamber  of  Commerce  to  the  
European  Union, May  27th   2005, p3 
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It  is  clear  from these  figures  that  sugar  producers  from  developing  and  least  
developed  countries  face  challenges  on  many  fronts. In  there  home  markets  they  
have  to  compete  with   heavily  subsidised  sugar  from  the  EU. Let  us  face  it:  as  
things stand  now,  this  practice  amounts  to  dumping  by  the  EU - European  sugar  
will  always  be  cheaper and  in  this  battle for  the  consumer, there  is  only  one  
winner. The  subsidised  EU sugar  not  only  floods  the  domestic  market  of  the  
producers, but  also  third  country  markets.  
“In  2001  for  example, Europe  exported  770,000  tonnes  of  white  sugar  to  
Algeria  and  150,000  tonnes  to  Nigeria-countries  that  would  be  potential  export  
markets  for  competitive  African  exporters  like  Malawi, Zambia  and  
Mozambique.”   15 
If  this  is  not  enough, once  the  producers  are  ready  to  export  to   the  European  
Union  they  face  a further  obstacle  in  the  form  of import  tariffs  and  duties. 
 
When  challenged  on  their  policies  relating  to  export  subsidies  and  payments  to  
farmers, the  EU  has  constantly  cited  the  need  to  protect  the  rural  way  of  life  as  
a  reason  for  continuing  with  these  particular  policies. EU  officials  maintain  
publicly  that  these support measures  enable  Europe’s  farmers   to  earn  a  decent  
and  sustainable  income. 
The  impression  is  created  that  these  CAP  policies  are  quite  benevolent, that  they  
are  targeted  to  assist  small-scale  farmers   make  ends  meet. I  believe  this  is  the  
impression  the  average  EU  citizen  has of  the  CAP  regime.  I  think  they  are  
wiling  to  go  along  and  continue  to  support  the  Union’s  agriculture  policies  if  
they  believe  that  the  payments  are  directed  at  supporting  small-scale  and  
subsistence  farmers.   
                                                 
15 CIDSE-APRODEV Position Paper, Reform  of  the  Sugar  Regime  in  the  European  Union-Policy  
Recommendations from  a development  perspective, April  2005,p5 
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Preserving  the  countryside - what  a myth! Apart  from  the  fact  that  the agricultural  
sector  accounts  for  a  very  small percentage  of  the  Union’s  workforce, CAP  
payments  in  most  instances  end  up with  rich ,large  scale  farmers  and  agri-business  
corporations  and  multinationals. This  is  particularly so  within  the  sugar  industry. 
Large  corporations   lead  the  way  in  the who’s  who  of  sugar  payment  
beneficiaries.  These  payments  are  almost  always  in  the  form  of  export  subsidies  
and  export  refunds. 
“The  largest  individual payments  made  to  the  UK  under  the  much  criticised  
common  agricultural  policy  are   going  to  multinational  food  companies  and  
not, as  commonly  assumed  to  farmers…millions  of  pounds  are  being paid  to  
manufacturers  of  bulk  fats  and  sugars  used  to  produce  processed foods.”16 
And  further: 
“While  most  people  still  believe  that  Europe’s  agricultural  subsidies  have  been  
used  to  protect  farmers, particularly  small  farmers, it  is  now emerging  that  
among  the  main  beneficiaries  are  large  multinationals.”17 
Some  of  the  largest  beneficiaries  of  CAP  sugar  payments  make  for  interesting  
reading  as  they  range  from  the  usual  suspects  such  Nestle  and  Cadbury  to  
interesting  recipients  such  as  Eton  College and  pharmaceutical  companies  such  as  
GlaxoSmithKline  and  ACS  Dobfar. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 www.sucre-ethique.org , Multinationals, not  farmers, reap biggest  rewards  in  Britain’s share  of  CAP payouts 
(accessed  on  6  September  2007) 
17 Supra…p2 
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Among  the  interesting  facts  to  arise  from the  investigation  conducted  by  the  
Guardian newspaper include: 
• Tate and  Lyle, a  British  multinational  received  the  largest  amount  of  CAP subsidies  
in  the  2003  to  2004  period. These  payments  amounted  to  227  million  pounds 
• Premier  Foods, a  company  accused  of  using  the  banned  Sudan  1  dye  in  its  
production  process( Sudan  1  is  carcinogenic)  received  about  60  000  pounds  in  
export  subsidies. 
• Eton  College  has  also  benefited from  CAP  payments  amounting  to  2,652  pounds  in  
the  2003-2004  period. Yet  strangely  Eton  cannot  explain  why  or  for  what  
purpose  the  payment  was  for. 
 
It  appears that  when  it  comes   to  CAP  payments, every  conceivable  loophole  is  
being  exploited. Airline  catering  companies  qualify  for  export  subsidies  because  
they  provide  small  servings  of  sugar  and  milk  to  airline  passengers. 
Pharmaceutical  companies  qualify  for  CAP  support  because  they  use  sugar  in  the  
production  of  certain  drugs  and  cough  mixtures. Basically everyone  is  trying  to  
get  their  snout  in  the  CAP  trough. 
 
According  to  Jack Thurston, a  former  special  advisor  to  the  UK  Ministry  of  
Agriculture: 
“The  CAP is  not  a  small  farms policy, even  though  most  people  still  think  it  
is. There    has  been  tremendous  resistance to publishing  the  figures  in  France, 
but most  of  it  will  be  going  to  agribusiness  and  the  really  big  farm  
companies, not  small  farms.”  18 
                                                 
18 www.sucre-ethique.org , Multinationals, not  farmers  reap  biggest  rewards  in  Britain’s  share  of  CAP  payouts 
(accessed on  6  September 2007)  
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An  illustration  of  Mr Thurston’s comments  is  that of  British  Sugar. It  is  a  
subsidiary  company  of  the  Associated  British  Foods  corporation.  In  the  2003  to 
2004  financial  period, British  Sugar  was  able  to  achieve  a  25%  profit  margin.  
This  is  quite  remarkable  considering that  their  main  area  of  operations  is  in  
agriculture  and  agriculture  is  a  notoriously  tough  economic  sector. The 25%  profit  
margin places  British  Sugar  at  the  top  of  the  EU’s  manufacturing  sector. 
“British  Sugar  is  among  the  most  vigorous  lobbyists  for  maintaining  the  
current  regime, having  built  an  entire  campaign  on  a selective  and  misleading  
interpretation  of  facts.”19 
 
Clearly  this  is  a status  quo  that  cannot  be  maintained  for  long. As  was  stated  by  
the  EU Commissioner  for  agriculture, Mr  Franz  Fischler ,  in  a  speech  to  the  
European  Union  parliament in  2004: 
“The  status quo  is however  no  longer  sustainable  and  we  must  prepare  the  
sugar  industry to   withstand  duty-free  imports  of  sugar   from  least  developed  
countries  under  the  EBA initiative…First  and  foremost  we must  become  more  
competitive.”20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 www.seatini.org , Issue: Development, Cotton  and  Sugar, 30 April-15May 2004, Volume 7  no.7,p6 
20 Speech: Franz  Fischler   to  the  Agriculture  Committee  of  European  Parliament, Brussels 21  September  2004 
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6.REFORM  OF  THE  EU/CAP  SUGAR  REGIME 
Due  to  increasing  pressure in  international  agriculture  trade  circles, the  European  
Union  has  been  forced  to  adjust  certain  policies  of  the  Common  Agricultural  
Policy. WTO  regulations, the  ever increasing  cost  of  the CAP  as  well  the  various  
trade  disputes  as  a  result  of  certain  CAP  policies  have  forced  the  Brussels  
bureaucrats  to  rethink  their  strategies.  Reform  is  especially  necessary  within  the  
sugar  sector. 
“Reform  of  the  EU’s  policies  offer  challenges, therefore to  EU policy  makers  
offering  on  the  one  hand  the opportunity  for  reduced  budgetary  commitments, 
but  on  the  other  the  problem  of  meeting  income  and  other  targets  for  the  
agricultural  sector  with   reduced  production levels”21 
 
The  European  Union  has  been  slow  to  reform  the  more  controversial  issues  of  
their sugar  policy  namely  the  use  of  export  subsidies  to  dump  excess  surpluses  
onto  the  world  market  and  the  issue  of  market  access  to  the  EU  for  developing  
and  least  developed  countries. On  the  export  subsidy  front, the  Europeans  have  
always  taken  the  position  that  any  reform  on  their  part  is  contingent  on  the  
USA  and  other  industrialised  states  undertaking  significant reforms  of  their  own. 
Already  in   the  year  2000, this  was  the  position  taken  by  EU  negotiators in  the  
first  real  concrete  attempt  to  reform  the  export  subsidy  program. 
“...EU released  a  proposal indicating  that  it  would  consider  making  further  
reductions  in  its  export  subsidies  provided  other  WTO members  reciprocated  
with  cuts  in  agricultural  support  measures.”  22 
 
 
                                                 
21 Milner C, Agricultural  export  subsidies  and  Developing  country  interests, p35 
22 www.ictsd.org, EU  willing  to  address export subsidies  at  next  WTO  AG Talks, Volume 4,No 26, 4 July  2000 
(accessed  on  3 August  2007)  
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Mr  Fischler went  further: 
“…Franz  Fischler  emphasised  that  any  reductions  in  the  EU  export  refunds  
could  only  be  done  if  all  forms  of  export  subsidisation  were  made  transparent  
and  subject  to  agreed  disciplines.”23 
One  of  the  sectors  that  have  been  subjected  to  an  overhaul  is  the  sugar  sector. 
This  change can  be  attributed  chiefly  to  the 2004 WTO  panel  decision  between  
EU  and  Brazil and  other interested  countries  such  a  Thailand  and  Australia. 
Within  the  sugar  sector most  of  the  reforms  have  centred  around  the  structure  of  
the payment  system  to  sugar  producers  and  the  sugar production  quotas. 
Payment  System 
A  major reform  was  that  the  policy  of  maintaining  a  intervention  price  was  
abolished. The  system  of  intervention  pricing  was  a  means  of  ensuring that  
European  sugar  producers  remained  competitive  despite  the  high costs  of  
production. Farmers  were  guaranteed  a  price  at  which  they  could  sell  their  sugar. 
This  system  was  quite  beneficial  to  EU  sugar producers: they  were  guaranteed  to  
generate  an  income  despite  the  fact  that  the  world  price  for  sugar  tended  to  be  
quite  volatile.  The fact  that  the  intervention  price  was  always  higher  than  the  
world  price  was  of  course  always  a  bonus.  In  most  instances  the  intervention  
price  was  about  three  times  higher  than  the world  price. The  reforms  as  proposed  
by  Mr  Fischler  in  2004 state  that: 
“And  the first  step  towards  this  is  to  reduce  support  prices. We  propose  doing  
away  with  intervention  in  the  sugar  markets  and  replacing  the  intervention  
price  with  a reference  price  about  one  third  less  than  the  current  intervention  
price”  24 
                                                 
23 www.ictsd.org ,  EU willing  to  address  export  subsidies  at  next  WTO  AG  Talks, Volume  4  No 26, 4 July  
2000 (accessed  on  3 August  2007)    
24 Speech: Franz  Fischler  speech  to  the  Agriculture Committee  of  European  Parliament, Brussels 21 September  
2004 
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This  cut  in   the  support  price  equates  to 632  euros  per  tonne  reduced to  421  
euros  per  tonne  by  the  end  of  the  2007-2008  financial  period.  In  addition to  the   
abolishment  of  the intervention  price  system,  a  proposal  was  made  to  create  a  
fund  to  support  the  small-scale  farmers  who  would  eventually  be  forced  out   of  
the  sugar  industry  as  a result  of  the  reforms.  This  fund  would  be  supported  
through  payments  and  levies  from  the  remaining  large  scale  sugar  farmers  and  
processors.  
 
Production Quotas  
As  I  have  stated, the  production  of  sugar  is divided  into three  different  categories. 
The  misuse  of  these  production  quota  categories  has  lead  to  the  problematic  
situation  we  have  with  export  subsidies.  Because  of  export  subsidies, EU  sugar  
producers  have  produced  in  excess  of  demand  capacity,  safe  in  the  knowledge  
that  there is  a  financial  safety  net  in  place  for  them.   
“it  is  undeniable  that  there  is  a structural  surplus  on  the  EU  sugar  market-this  
is  why  the quotas  need  to  be  adjusted…For  sugar  production  outside  the  
quotas.”25 
The  reform  of  the  production  quotas  was  centred  on  a merger  of  the  ‘A’  and  
‘B’ production  categories  as  well  as  a  reduction  of  the  overall level  of   quotas. In  
actual  terms  this  amounted  to  a  reduction  in  quota  levels  of  about  1,3  million  
tonnes  within  the  first  year  of  the  transitional  period( *this  will  be  highlighted  at  
a  later  stage). This  first  cut  was  followed  by  three  further cuts  of  about  0.5  
million  tonnes  each.  These  reductions  in  the quota  levels  would  lead  to  the stated  
goal  of  a  2.8 million  tonne  reduction. 
 
                                                 
25 Speech: Franz  Fischler  Speech  to  the  Agriculture  Committee  of  the  European  Parliament, Brussels  21  
September  2004 
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The  thinking  behind  adjusting  the  quota  levels  was  that  if  the  farmers  were  
capped  at  certain  quota  levels, there  would  be  no overproduction  of  sugar  and  
consequently  there  would  be  no  incentive  to  utilise  export  subsidies.     
 
The reform  of the  sugar  industry  would  of  cause  also  lead  to  a  reduction  in  the 
level  of  CAP  expenditure. A cost  saving  exercise  is  of  course  very  important  to  
most  European citizens  since  they  are  the  ones  who  ultimately  bear  the  costs  of  
CAP. In  terms  of  the  reforms, the  sugar  regime  expenditure  would  be  reduced  
from  1531  million  euros  to  1446  million  euros  in  the  2008  to  2009  financial  
period. In 2004, an  influential  think-tank  put  forward  their   agenda for  the  reform  
of  the  sugar  industry.  The total  reforms  were  set  out  as  follows: 
• A  reduction  of  about  5.2 million  tonnes, or  one-third  in  the  EU  quota to  end  all  
exports, facilitate  an  increase  in  imports  from  least  developed  countries  and  a 
realignment  of  domestic  production  to  come  in  line  with  consumption  levels. 
• An  immediate  prohibition  on  non-quota  exports(2.7 million  tonnes)  and  a domestic  
quota  cut  of  around  2.5  million  tonnes. 
• An  incremental, graduated  cut  in  quotas  over  the  period  2006-2013  to  
accommodate  an  additional  2.7  million  tonnes  from  Least  Developed  Countries  at  
prices  linked  to  those  on  the  EU market. 
• The  elimination  of  all  direct  and  indirect  export  subsidies  with  immediate  effect. 
• A  programme  of  increased  aid and  compensation  for  ACP exporters, financed  by  a  
transfer  of  the  1.3  billion  euros  now  allocated  to export  subsidies. The  programme  
would  include  a  ‘quota  buy-back’ option, under  which  ACP countries  could  sell 
their  quota  back  to the  EU  in  return  for  a  guaranteed  flow  of  assistance. 
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• A  redistribution  of  CAP  support  towards  smaller  farmers, and  an  EU-wide  
investigation  of  the  activities of  sugar  processors, conducted  by  national  
competition  authorities.26 
 
7.THE  ROLE  THAT  THE  EBA  INTIATIVE  PLAYS  WITHIN  THE  EU  SUGAR  
REGIME 
The  EBA  initiative  was  introduced  in  2001  as  part  of  EU  efforts  to  assist  ACP 
(African, Caribbean and Pacific) states, especially  those classified  as  least  developed, 
to  develop  their  economies. The EBA (Everything  But  Arms) initiative  granted  
certain  states  duty  free access  to  the  European  market for  specified  products. 
“The  EU’s Everything-But-Arms  Initiative…will provide  a  valuable  source  of  
market  access  and  finance  for  Least  Developed  Countries. Reform  proposals  
must  look  to  secure  this  access, whilst  more  needs  to  be  done by  the 
Commission  to  ensure  that  this access  supports  development  in  LDC’s.”     27 
With  respect  to   sugar  imports  from  ACP  states, 1,3  million  tonnes  of  sugar  was  
given  preferential  access  to  the  EU  market annually. ACP  sugar  producers were  
able  to  receive  the  same  price  for  their  sugar  that  they  imported  to  the  EU as  
their  European  counterparts. 
 
It  would  appear  that  the  EBA  initiative  is  a  credible  step  forward in  assisting  
third  world  producers and  in  some way, reforming   certain  European  agricultural  
sectors. However  later  developments  have  impaired  the  effectiveness  of  the  EBA  
initiatives.  
                                                 
26 www.seatini.org ,Issue: Development,Cotton,Sugar,30 April-15 May 2004, Volume 7 No 7 p8  
 (accessed  on  6  September  2007) 
27 CIDSE-APRODEV, Reform  of  the  Sugar  Regime in  the EU- Policy  recommendations  from  a developmental  
perspective, April 2005,p7 
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Sugar  producers  and  lobbyists  were  able  to  force  significant  concessions  from  
the  EU  Commission. The  sugar  sector  was  exempted  from  having  to  provide  free 
market  access. The    current  system  of  preferential  market  access  could  be  
retained.  This  concession  will  be  in  effect  until  2009, the  reasoning  being  that  
European  sugar  producers  need  more  to  time  to  restructure  in  order  to  be  more  
competitive.  This  is  not  the  only  concession  that  the  producers  managed  to  win. 
“…adding  a  clause  that  will  make  it  possible  to  block  imports  if  the  EU  
sugar price  starts  to  fall. Development  groups  dubbed  the  initiative ‘Everything 
but Arms—and Sugar’.”      28 
In  a  Position  Paper, the American  Chamber  of  Commerce to  the European  Union  
expressed its  views   on  the  reforms  and  what  it  hoped  would  be  achieved: 
“LDC’s however, will  benefit  from  unrestricted  duty  free  access  to the  EU as  
of  2009, and  currently  ACP and  LDC  countries  benefit  from  restricted  duty  
free  access  within  quotas. Even  if  the  EU  decreases  its  external  protection  
substantially, ACP’s  and  LDC’s  will  have  a margin  of  preference  over  Brazil  
for  exports  to  the  EU…The  conditions  should  be  set  to  give  LDC’s  a  
sustainable  competitive  advantage, allowing  them  to  realize  the  advantage  they  
would  naturally  have, were  it  not  for  the  market  distortions  caused  by  
developed  country  agricultural  policies…LDC  countries should  seek  to  ensure  
that  the  EU  does  not  introduce  any  measures  such  as  safeguard  clauses  that  
could  prevent  them  from exporting  freely  to  the  EU  as  intended  under  the  
Everything But  Arms (EBA agreement).”  29 
 
                                                 
28 Thurow R  and  Winestock  G, Addiction  to  Sugar  Subsidies  Chokes  Poor  Nations  Exports: Byzantine System, 16 
September 2002, p5 
29 AMCHAM EU, Position  Paper  on  Sugar and  the  Doha  Development Round: ACP  and  LDC  countries  will  
continue  to   benefit  from a large  preference  margin  for their  sugar  exports  to  the  EU, May  27  2005, p3,para5 
 
 
 
 
 46
It  would  appear that  European  producers  have  ensured  that  their  interests  are  well  
protected  despite  attempts  to  allow  more  foreign  sugar  into  the  EU.  The  situation  
appears  to  be  a  classic  case  of ‘leading  them  to  the  water, but  not  letting  them  
drink’. 
 
8.ARE THE REFORMS  OF  THE  SUGAR  REGIME  GOING  TO  HAVE  A 
SIGNIFICANT  IMPACT? 
The reform  of  the  European  sugar  industry  is  a  necessary  process.  However  in  
certain  policy  areas,  these  reforms  are  not  adequate  enough.  These  reforms  do  
not  comprehensively  deal  with  the  issue  of  export  subsidies, they  do  not  address  
the  issue  over  sugar  imports  from  ‘stronger’  developing  countries  such  as  South  
Africa, Brazil, Thailand  etc. The  initiatives  to  assist  certain  developing  and  least  
developed  countries  although  laudable, come  with  certain  strings  attached, 
detracting  from  the  overall  impact  of  these  initiatives.   
 
On  the  export  subsidy  front,  the  whole  issue  over  their  use  is   not  addressed  
directly. The  reforms  relate  to  the  level  of  sugar  production  that  should  be  
maintained  within  the  Union. In  an  indirect  manner  it  is  hoped  that  if  excess  
production  is  eliminated, then  there  will  be  no  need  to  use  export  subsidies. I  
believe  that  this  issue  is  serious  enough  that  it  should  be  dealt  with  directly. EU  
regulations at  this  stage do not  expressly  prohibit  the  use  of  export  subsidies  (in  
line  with current WTO views).  Nothing  prevents  EU  producers  from  continuing  to  
benefit  from  the  export  subsidy  scheme. This  ‘crutch’  for  sugar  producers  
represents  a significant  income  earner  for  an  industry  that  operates  at  quite  a  
high  cost  of  production. 
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“…the EU  will remain  a  major  subsidising  exporter: the  proposals  will  not  end  
all directly  subsidised  exports, let  alone  all  indirectly subsidised  exports. As  a 
result,  sugar  will  remain  a  source  of  dispute  at  the  WTO.”  30 
Any concessions  made  are  usually  accompanied  by  ample  time  frames, allowing   
the  sugar  industry  in  Europe  to  take  their  time  in  implementing  serious  reforms. 
As I  will argue  in  Chapter  four  and  five, export  subsidies  within  CAP will  only  
be  prohibited  in  2013. 
 
The  European  Union’s  policies  regarding  market  access  in  terms  of  sugar  negate  
some  of  the  positive  impacts of  EBA  initiatives. With  regard  to  sugar, the  EBA 
initiative will  only  have  substantial  benefits  for  a  handful  of  ACP/LDC  states, 
chief  among  this select  group - Mauritius. Therefore  there  is  hardly  an  equitable  
distribution  of  benefits  as  intended  by  the  EBA  initiatives.  Europe  also  continues  
to block  export  opportunities  for  certain  developing  countries such  as  Brazil  and  
South  Africa.  The  sugar  industries  in  these  states  are  on  par  with  their  European  
rivals  and  can  offer  a  product which  can  go  head  to  head  with  EU sugar  in  
terms of  quality and  value. Yet  because  of  the  high  EU  import barriers, the  
domestic  EU  market  is  almost  impossible  to  penetrate  for  foreign  sugar  
producers. The  current  EU  reforms  fail  to  adequately  address  these  issues. To  me  
the  EU  position  is  quite  hypocritical. On  the one  hand  they  preach  market  
liberalisation  and  want  developing  countries  to  open  their  markets  to  EU  
manufactured  goods. Yet  when  it  comes  to agricultural  goods, a  sector  where  
developing  countries  have  a  comparative  advantage, EU  policies are  quick  to  
revert  to  a protectionist  stance.  
                                                 
30 CIDSE-APRODEV, Reform  of  the  Sugar  Regime  in  the EU-Policy  recommendations  from  a  developmental  
perspective, April 2005,p10 
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The  situation  is  made  even  more  galling  by  the fact  that  EU  sugar  producers  can  
offload  their  surpluses, thus  flooding  the  market  and  depressing  world  prices, 
through  state  aid  in  the  form  of  export  and  related  subsidies. Developing  states  
are  at  a further  disadvantage, since  they  rarely  have the  economic  resources  to  
provide  related export  subsidies  to  match  the  Europeans. 
“…they  fail  to address  the concerns  of  developing  countries. They  ignore  the  
LDC’s  proposal  to  amend  the  EBA  initiative  to  give  them  adequate  time  to  
build  their sugar  industries,  and  fail to  offer  increased  aid  and  technical  
assistance  to  help  LDC’s  develop  their  supply  capacity  and  improve  it on  a 
economically, socially  and  ecologically  sustainable  basis. There  are  no  concrete  
proposals to assist  ACP  countries to adjust  to  EU reform.”        31 
Certain  EU  Member  States are  proving  to  be  an  obstacle  in  the road  to   reform. 
These  countries  stand  to  lose  a  significant  amount  of  financial  aid  as  a  result  of  
the  CAP  reforms. In  certain  Member  States, this  loss of  revenue  will  have  
important  social  and  political  implications. The  agricultural  sector  in  countries  like  
France  and  Germany  is  powerful  and  well  organised, able  to  wield  significant  
political  clout. Member  State  governments  are  wary  of  these  CAP reforms, as  it  
could  have  significant  implications  come  election  time. 
“ The  reform  package  would  cut  the  guaranteed  internal  minimum  prices  for  
sugar to farmers  and  processing  companies  by  39  percent  over  two  years  
starting  in  2006. It  would  also  compensate  EU  sugar beet  farmers  for  60%  of  
the  price  cut, but  only  through  direct  payments  decoupled  from  production…it  
offers  grants  to  encourage  less  competitive  producers  to  leave  the  sector  
through  a  four-year  restructuring  scheme.”32 
 
                                                 
31 CIDSE-APRODEV, Reform  of the  Sugar  Regime  in  the  EU-Policy  recommendations  from  a  developmental  
perspective, April  2005,p10,para 3 
32 www.ictsd.org , Eleven  EU  Members  reject  Commission’s  sugar  reform, Volume  9 No 37, 2 November 2007 
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Amongst  the  counter-proposals  put  forward  by  the  disgruntled  Member  States: 
“ …Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland ,Finland, Poland, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania  and  Slovenia-have  demanded  lower  price  cuts, longer  transition  
periods  and  higher  compensation. These  countries  can block  the  planned  
reforms  and  could  complicate  the  EU’s  negotiating  position  in  the  run-up  to  
the  Hong-Kong  Ministerial  Conference…” 33 
Clearly  some  divisions exist  within  the  European  Union  as  to  the  nature  of  the  
CAP  reforms. It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  majority  of  objections  came  from  
the  recently  added  Central  and  Eastern  European  states. Even  though  these  states  
were  aware of  the  proposed  reforms  during  their  accession  negotiations, it  appears  
they  are  still  somewhat  rankled  by  the  fact  they  are  getting  a smaller  slice  of  
the  CAP  pie. 
 
9.THE ROLE  OF  THE    SUGAR  INDUSTRY  WITHIN  SOUTH  AFRICAN  
SOCIETY 
European  policies  have  had  a  significant  impact  on  the  way  most  countries  
conduct  business   when  it  comes  to  the  international  trade  in  agricultural  
products.  South  Africa is  no exception, especially  when  it  comes  to  the  sugar  
trade. South  Africa  is  one  of  the  leading  exporters  of  raw  sugar  in  the  world. 
The  majority  of  South  Africa’s  sugar  production  is  destined  for  the  export  
market.  In  the  2005 to  2006 financial  period, the South African  Sugar  Association  
statistics  showed  that  the sugar  cane  crop  improved  from  19,094  million  tonnes  
the  previous  financial  period  to  that  of 21,052  million tonnes. Sugar  production  
was  increased  from  2,226  million  tonnes  to  2,500  million  tonnes.  34  
                                                 
33 Supra…p2 
34 www.sasa.co.za , Press Release: Recovery  in  the  sugar  industry’s  financial  returns  reported  on by  Rodger  
Stewart,  the  South  African  Sugar Association  Chairman  at the  Associations  AGM  held  on  28  June 2006, p1 
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The  South  African  sugar industry  is  a  significant  role-player  in the  social  and  
economic  affairs  of  South Africa. On  the  economic  front, the  earnings  generated  
from  the  export   of  sugar  contributes significantly  to  the  Gross  Domestic  Product 
(GDP), behind  other  commodities  such  as the  mining  resources. The  sugar  industry  
is  also  large  scale    employer, particularly  in  the  provinces  of  Kwa-Zulu  Natal, 
Mpumalanga  and  the  Eastern  Cape. 
“  These  estates, which  stretch  from  the  Eastern  Cape  Province  through Kwa-
Zulu  Natal  and  Mpumalanga, are  estimated  to  employ  about  five  full-time  and  
ten  seasonal  workers  for  each  medium  sized  farm. Total  employment figures  
for  the  South African  sugar  sector  stand at   250 000  full-time  workers  and  500 
000  seasonal  workers”35 
These  employed  persons  in  turn  make  a significant  contribution  to  the  overall  
South African  economy.  Most  of  South  Africa’s  sugar  production  is  concentrated  
at  a  grass roots  level. The  SA  sugar  industry  is  characterised  by  a  large  number  
of  small  to  medium  producers  and  a  core  group  of  large  producers. 
“ Current  estimates  of the  number  of South  African  sugar  producers  stands  at  
about   51 000  small  and  medium-sized  sugar  growers  with  2000  large  scale  
estates.”    36 
 
The economic  activities  of  the South  African  sugar  industry  are  conducted  in a  
manner  so  that  they  are  in  conformity  and  assist  in  achieving  the  goals  of  the  
South  African  government’s  policy  framework - ASGISA( Accelerated  and  Shared  
Growth  Initiative  for  South Africa). 
                                                 
35 www.tralac.org , EU  sugar  subsidies  hurting  South Africa (accessed  on  28  July  2007) 
36 www.tralac.org , EU sugar  subsidies  hurting  South  Africa (accessed  on 28  July  2007) 
 
 
 
 
 51
“…review the  sugar  industry’s  role  in  the  economic  and  social  development  of  
South  Africa  and  more  particularly  in  the  areas  in  which  the  industry  has  a 
production  footprint.”37 
Some  of  the  ASGISA  goals  the  sugar  industry  can  play  a  part  in  include: 
“The  vision  of  ASGISA  development  path  envisages  a vigorous  and  inclusive  
economy, value  addition  to  our  products  and  services, reduction  of  costs  of  
production  and  distribution, the  absorption  of  labour  into  sustainable  
employment  and  the  encouragement  of  new  businesses  to  proliferate  and  
expand”38 
 
The  ASGISA  framework  represents  a classic  example  of  those  ‘public-private  
partnerships’  which  appear  to  be  so  in  vogue  these  days. Some  of the areas  that  
were  highlighted  in  the  SASA  2006  AGM  report, was  the  role that  sugar  
producers  and  processors  could  play  in  areas  such  as: 
• Education 
• The  improvement  of  infrastructure  facilities 
• The  upgrade  of  skills  of  the  workers  employed  within  the  sugar  industry 
• Environmental  conservation 
• Further  research  into  the  use of  sustainable  resources  and  bio-fuels. 
In  the field  of  education,  it  is  understandable  that  sugar  processors  would  want  
to  invest  in  the  improvement  of  educational  facilities. An  improvement  in  
educational  facilities  will  lead  to  an  improvement  in  the  skill  level  and  
competence  of  potential employees. 
                                                 
37 Press  Release: Recovery  in  the  sugar  industry’s  financial  returns  reported  on  by  Rodger  Stewart, the  South 
African  Sugar  Association’s  Chairman  at  the  Association’s  AGM, 28  June  2006 p1  
38 Supra 
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“…provides  ongoing  impetus  to the  Sugar  Industry  Trust  Fund  for  Education  
focus  on  school  building. During  the  last  14  years  of  the  Trust, with  its  
funding  partners,  has  facilitated  the  building  of  420  classrooms  and  36  
administration  offices.  This  is  a small  contribution  to  a fundamental  
infrastructure  weakness  that will  require  continued  attention  for  the  
improvement  in  education, another  ASGISA   imperative.” 39 
 
The  upgrade  of  infrastructure  projects  is  beneficial  both  to the private  sector  as  
well  as government. For  the  private  sector, in  this  case  sugar  processors, improved  
transport  networks i.e.  road  and  rail networks  and  the  improvement  of  export 
facilities i.e. harbour  facilities, will  in  the  long  term  be  beneficial  since  the  
producers  and  processors  are  able  to  reduce  transport  costs  and  delays  in the  
shipping  of  sugar  supplies  will  be  reduced. For  the  public  authorities, this  
initiative  essentially  means  that  the  costs  of  maintaining  and  upgrading  the  
relevant  transport  networks  is  shared  with   the  private  sector. It  is  basically  a  
cost-saving  exercise. 
“ The  maintenance  and  upgrade  of  the  road  systems  used to  transport  20  
million  tonnes  of  sugar  cane  each  year  are  essential to  ensure efficient  and  
cost  effective  logistics. Co-ordination  with  the  local  planning  authorities will  be  
required  to  keep  the  industry’s local  transport  infrastructure  in  good  order.”      
40 
SASA  has  also  contributed  in efforts  to  create  a  more  integrated  market  within  
Southern  Africa. The  sugar  industries  of  Mozambique, Swaziland, Zimbabwe  and  
South  Africa  are  moving  closer  towards  an  integration  plan  which  is  especially  
beneficial  to  LDC  producers such  as  Mozambique  and  Swaziland. 
                                                 
39 Press Release: Recovery  in the  sugar  industry’s  financial  returns  reported  on   by  Rodger Stewart, the  South  
African  Sugar  Association’s  Chairman  at  the  Association’s   AGM, 28  July  2006, p2  
40 Supra 
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“ With  respect  to  infrastructure  investment, a  joint  venture  of the  sugar  
industries  of  Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland  and Zimbabwe  is  in  the  
final  stages  of  a major  upgrade of  the  sugar  terminal  in  the  Maputo  harbour. 
This  70  million  rand  project  is an  example  of  the  beneficial  result  of  
government’s  focus  on  improved  infrastructure  and  logistics  in  the  Maputo  
Corridor. Further, this  project  is  one of  the  fruits of  the  SADC Sugar  Co-
operation  agreement.”  41 
And  further: 
“…SASA  has  likewise  been  interacting  closely with  government, and  has  
played a  key  role in  the  design, implementation  and  management  of  the SADC  
Sugar  protocol. The  Work  Programme  on  the  Technical Committee  on  Sugar  
has  incrementally  produced  better  understanding  of  the  SADC  sugar  sector  
amongst  sugar  industry  and  government  representatives  through  a sharing  of  
information.”42 
 
Bio-fuels  and  renewable  energy  sources  is  currently  quite  a  hot  topic  in light  of  
the  debate  surrounding  climate  change  and  global  warming.  The  sugar  industry  
worldwide  is  focusing  more  and  more  on  the  production  of  bio-fuels  as  means  
of  adding  supplementary  incomes. The  South  African  sugar  industry  is  no  
exception, investing  resources  to  establish  the viability  of  bio-fuels  such  as  ethanol  
and  relatively  new  discovery: biobutanol. 
                                                 
41 Press  Release: Recovery  in  the  sugar  industry’s  financial  returns  reported  on  by  Rodger  Stewart, the South  
African  Sugar  Association’s Chairman  at  the  Association’s  AGM, 28  July 2006, p2 
42 Supra…p3 
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“…working  hard to  ensure  that  the  sugar  industry  continues  to  be a  major  
player  in  the  renewable  energy  debate…allow  its members  the opportunity  to  
participate  fully  and  on  a level  playing  field  in  renewable  energy  production43 
 
10.IMPACT  OF  CAP  POLICIES  ON  THE  SOUTH  AFRICAN  SUGAR  
INDUSTRY 
Certain  CAP  policies have  had  a  significant  impact  on  the  way  the  domestic  
sugar  industry  operates. The  use  of  support  payments  and  export  subsidies  to  
assist  their  sugar  producers, have  placed  European  producers  at  a distinct  
advantage  to  their  South  African  counterparts. South  African  producers  face  the 
challenge  of  competing  on  the  international  market  as  well  as  their  domestic  
market against  EU  sugar  that  will  be  always  cheaper  because  it  is  so  heavily 
subsidised. 
“…this  has  lead  Ongaat-Hulett, a  JSE-listed  firm  that  operates  in  the  
agricultural  sector, to  say  that ‘while  world  market  prices  can  be  expected  to  
rise  on  production  shortfalls  induced  by  adverse  climatic  conditions, the  long  
term  solution  to  improving  price  levels  generally  lies  in  the  elimination, under  
the  auspices  of  the  World  Trade  Organisation, of  tariffs  which  afford  
protection  to  many  high-cost  producers  in  the  world.”  44 
The  policies  pursued  by  the  EU have  resulted  in  significant  socio-economic  
consequences for  South  Africa.  On the  monetary  front , South Africa  has  suffered  
considerable  losses  when  it  comes to  export  revenue.  According  to  a  2002  report  
by  OXFAM, ‘Sugar  Scam’, it  was  estimated that  South Africa  lost  about 150  
million  dollars  in  lost  export  opportunities.  To  highlight  this  point  further, the  
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44 www.tralac.org , EU sugar subsidies  hurting  South  Africa, (accessed  on  28   July   2007) p 2 
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developmental  aid  that   South  Africa  receives from  the  EU  is  largely  negated  by  
the  effect  of  EU  agricultural  policies. 
“…the  roughly  120  million  dollars  in  aid  the  EU  extends  to  South  Africa  
every  year  is  nearly  erased  by  the more than 100  million dollars  in  potential  
export  revenues  the  country  loses  to  sugar  dumping.”45 
As  stated previously, a  major  share  of  South  Africa’s  sugar   production  is  set  
aside  for  the  export  market. A  formula  has  been  developed  by  agricultural  
economists  whereby  the various  EU   support  measures  are  eliminated.  With  regard  
to  South  Africa, this  formula  indicates  that  if  all  forms  of  agricultural  subsidies  
are  eliminated, the  sugar  price  would  increase  by  20%  leading  to  an  extra  40  
million  euros  or  approximately  400  million  rand  in  the  government  coffers. This  
cash  injection  into  the  agricultural  industry  and  in  particular  the  sugar  sector  
would  result  in  the  expansion  of the  sugar  cane  capacity  and  potentially  60  
million euros  or  600  million  rand  in  extra  export  revenues  46 
Since  the  South  African  sugar  industry  is  heavily  dependent  on  the  export  
market, any  volatility  in  the  world  price   of  sugar  would  have  negative  
repercussions  for  the  industry.  In  most  instances  these  repercussions  or  in  the  
form  of  mass  layoffs  and  unemployment. 
“ Between  1997  and 2000, an  increase in  South  African  imports  of  EU  sugar  
and  chocolate  confectionary  contributed  to a  21%  decline  of  consumption  of  
domestically  produced  sweets  and  chocolates, reducing  consumption  and  
employment  in  South  African  domestic  industry. Beacon Sweets, the largest  
employer  in  the  industry, retrenched  1000  employees  between 1997  and  2000  
and  the  industry  reduced  its  use  of  local  sugar  from  40 000  tonnes  in  1995  
                                                 
45 Thurow R and Winestock G, Addiction  to  Sugar  Subsidies  Chokes  Poor  Nations  Exports, 16  September  2002, 
p3 
46 www.tralac. org , The  state  of  SA’s  trade  agreements, 18  August  2003, p3 
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to  35 000  tonnes  in  1999, provoking  significant  losses  in  employment, mainly  
in  rural  areas.”   47 
As  an  illustrative  example, the  Wall  Street  Journal  conducted  interviews  with  
producers and  role-players  in  the  sugar  producing  area  of  Entumeni, Kwa-Zulu  
Natal: 
“If  the  price  was  better, you’d  see  more  cars, electricity  and  running  water  
around  here, said Eros  Nene, the  development  officer  of  the  local  growers  
association…The  area’s  3,700  small-scale  growers…are  being  pushed  to  plant  
more land, even  though  it makes  no  economic  sense  at all…But  it  is  a  matter  
of  survival”48 
 
11.THE  ROLE  OF  THE  TRADE AND  DEVELPOMENT  COOPERATION  
AGREEMENT (TDCA) 
The  Trade and Development Cooperation  Agreement (TDCA)  was  concluded  
between  the  European  Union  and  South  Africa  in 1999, with  most  of  the  
provisions  relating  to  agriculture  coming  into  effect. South  Africa  and  the  EU 
share  quite  a  close  and  important  relationship.  The  EU  is  South  Africa’s largest  
trading  partner  and  also  the  biggest  donor  of  development  aid. About  40%   of  
South  Africa’s  total  agricultural  exports  is  destined  for  the  European  market.  
South  Africa  enjoys  a  close  trading  relationship  unlike  any  other  developing  
countries 
Therefore  it  should  be  no  surprise  that  a bilateral  agreement   is  necessary  to  
regulate  the  finer  points  and  issues  of  this  trade  relationship.  The  TDCA  is  
essentially  an  attempt  by  the  two  entities  to  create a  free  trade  area.  This  is  in  
                                                 
47 Supra…p1 
48 Thurow R  and  Winestock  G, Addiction  to  Sugar  Subsidies  Chokes  Poor  Nations  Exports, 16  September 2002, 
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line  with  the  nature  of  trade  relationship  between  the  EU  and  South  Africa. 
However  this  agreement  does  not  purport  to  create  a  conventional  free  trade  area.   
The  free  trade agreement  envisaged  in  terms  of  the TDCA  is  asymmetric  in  
nature.  South  Africa  has  been  given  more  time  to  liberalise  certain  product  
sectors  i.e. to  reduce  or  eliminate  import  tariffs  totally. South  Africa  is  also  
permitted , in  terms  of  the  TDCA, to  allow  a  smaller  percentage  of  EU  imports  
into  the  domestic  market  compared to  what  the  Europeans  are  allowing  into  their  
market. 
“...transitional  period  of  12  years,  meaning  that  the  EU  and  South  Africa  will  
open  their  markets  to  each  other  at  a  different  pace…At  the  end  of  a 10  year  
transition  period, 95%  of  South  African  imports will  enter  the EU  duty  free. 
South Africa  will  grant  duty  free  access  to  86%  of  all  EU  imports  into  South  
Africa  over  a 12  year  period.”     49 
 
 
However  the  familiar  issue  over  the  EU’s  agricultural  policies  does  create   
tensions  within  the  trade  relationship  between  the  European  Union  and  South  
Africa.  In  this  instance  the  TDCA  fails to  adequately  address  these  tensions  
particularly  over  the  European  Union’s  use  of  export  subsidies  to export  surplus  
quantities  of  agricultural  produce.  The  TDCA  does  make  mention  over  the  use  
of  export  subsidies.  Article  17.1  appears  to  me  to  be  a  sort  of  a  quid  pro  quo  
provision. If  the  South  African  authorities  feel  that, EU  export subsidies  are  
having  a negative  impact  on  its  domestic  market, they  can  then  approach  their  
EU  counterparts  to  negotiate  a reduction  in the  use  of  support  measures  by  the  
                                                 
49 www.wwb.co.za , Meltzer S, Nzimande M, Harvey J, South  African  trade  relationships  and Anti-Dumping, 
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EU  in  return  for  the  South  Africans  liberalising  further  product  sectors i.e.  
reducing  import  duties  even  further. 
“ Article   17.1…basically  what   it does  is  to  offer  an  opportunity  to  negotiate   
the removal  of  these  subsidies  where  South  Africa  feels  that  its  domestic  
market  could  handle  duty-free  imports.”  50 
 
To  me  Article  17.1  is  flawed  in  its  application.  There  is  no  way  of  forcing  the  
Europeans  to  comply  with  the  requests  and  the  South  Africans  can  only  effect  
changes  if  the  Europeans  are  in  agreement  and  willing to  negotiate.  This  situation 
is highlighted by  Article17.2: 
“ If  the  EU   is  not  willing  or  unable to eliminate  export  subsidies  in  terms  of 
Article  17.1, Article  17.2  gives  South  Africa  the  right  to  withdraw  its  offer  of  
accelerated  tariff  liberalisation and  the  status  quo  remains.”51 
So  if  they  Europeans  do  not  want  to  play  along ,  there  is  basically  nothing  the  
South Africans  can  do  in terms  of  the  TDCA  to  force them  to  abandon  their  use  
of  export  subsidies. 
This  situation  is  reflected  by  the  following statement: 
“With  the  exception of  Article  17.1, the  EU  has  made no  commitments  to   
remove  or  reduce  export  subsidies  on  exports  into  South  Africa. This  implies  
that  even  after  the  end  of  the  implementation  period, the  EU is  still  within  its  
rights  to  utilise  export  subsidies  or  any  other  trade-distorting  support  
measures.”52 
 
                                                 
50 www.tralac.org , Rolf  Joachim Otto, European  Subsidies  in  Agriculture  under  the  SA-EU Trade  and 
Development Cooperation  Agreement ( accessed on  10  September 2007)   
51 Supra 
52 www.tralac.org , Rolf  Joachim Otto, European  Subsidies  in  Agriculture  under  the  SA-EU Trade  and 
Development Cooperation  Agreement ( accessed on  10  September 2007)   
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12.CONCLUDING  THOUGHTS 
What  the  European’s  have  achieved  through  their  Common  Agricultural Policy  is  
very  impressive  if  you  consider   the  way  the  European  agricultural  sector  has  
transformed  itself  in  little  more  than  45  years. However  the  way  the  Europeans  
have  gone  about  in  achieving  this  remarkable  transformation,  has  resulted  in  
many  disgruntled  voices  within  the  world  agricultural market.  Due  to  EU  policies  
of  domestic  support  and   assistance  in  the  export  arena, European  agricultural  
producers  have  been  able  to become  major  producers  in  the  world. The  groups  
most  affected  by  the  ‘CAP  miracle’, are  the  farmers  and  producers  from  
developing  countries.  They  have  been  gradually squeezed  out  by  the  major  
European  agri-business  corporations. 
There  is  no  clearer  example  of  this  than  the  global  sugar  industry.  Despite  the  
fact  that  the  cost  of  production  is  quite  high  in  the  EU  and  much  of  the  sugar  
industry  is  made up  of  inefficient  producers,  Europe  remains  one  of the  leading  
exporters  of  sugar.  
Despite  the  fact  that  South  Africa  is  more  economically  stable  than  many  of  the  
other  sugar  producers,  it  nevertheless  also  incurs  significant  negative  impacts  
such  as  the  loss  of  export  revenue  and  the  loss  of  employment  opportunities  for  
the  local  workforce. 
 
As  I  have  stated,  I  believe  the  key  to  addressing  the  imbalances  which  exist  in  
the  international agricultural  trade  lie  in  the  reform  of  CAP  policies, most  notably  
those  relating  to  the  use  of  export  subsidies.  In  the  next  chapter,  I will  be  
examining  the  arguments  for  and  against  the  use  of  export  subsidies  as  well as  
the views  of  the  major  role  players  in  this global  debate. 
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1.INTRODUCTION 
In  the  previous  chapters  I  have  examined  the  use  of  export  subsidies  within   the 
multilateral  trading  system especially  in  the  arena  of  international  agricultural  
trade, the  disciplines  imposed  on  the  utilisation  of  export  subsidies  by  the  World  
Trade  Organisation (WTO) through  the  Agreement  on  Agriculture, the  policies  
pursued  by  the  biggest  user  of  export  subsidies  within  agriculture, the  European  
Union  and  the  impact of  these  policies  on  the  South  African  agriculture  sector, 
using  the  SA  sugar  industry  to  highlight  the  particular  effects  of   EU  policies  
through  CAP. 
 
In  this  chapter  I  will  be  exploring  the  various  viewpoints  of  the  major  role-
players  in  this  ongoing  debate  surrounding  the  use  of  export  subsidies. Is  the  
continued  use  of  export  subsidies, particularly  when  it  comes  to  agriculture, of  
benefit  to  more  than  just  the  large  agri-business corporations  in  the  industrialised  
world? Do  the  proponents  of  the  continued  use  of  export  subsidies  and  support  
payments  have  valid  arguments  that  extend  beyond  preserving  their  balance 
sheets? Does  the  use  of  export  subsidies  in  the agricultural  sphere  have  any  
worthwhile  social  welfare  benefits? 
 
On  the  other  hand,  are  organisations  such  as  Oxfam  and  other  multinational  
NGO’s  correct  in  their  view  that  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  in  the  
agricultural  sphere  will  result  in an improvement  in the  welfare  and  standard  of  
living  of  many  millions  in  developing  and  least  developed  countries.  Are major  
trading  blocs  such  as  the  Cairns  Group, the  G-20  and  the  G-90  correct  in  their  
viewpoint   that  the  export  subsidies  have  created  a major  trade  distortions  within  
the  international  agricultural  trade.   
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Why  are  major  agricultural  produce  exporters  such  as  Brazil , Australia  and  South  
Africa  so  determined  to  see an end  in  the use   of  export  subsidies  by  the  
European  Union, USA  and  other  first  world  countries.  What  would  the  resultant  
benefits  be  to  these  states  if  agricultural  subsidies  were  to  be  eliminated? 
Economic  simulation  models  have  been  undertaken  by  organisations  such  as  the  
United  Nations( through  UNCATAD)  and  the  Organisation  for  Economic  
Cooperation  and  Development ( OECD)  to  analyse  the  potential  consequences  of  
a total  elimination  of  export  subsidies. The  results  of  these  studies  have  raised  
some  interesting  discussion  points.  These  studies  have  shown  that  as  in  most  
things  in  life, there  are  winners   and  losers  in  the  event  of  an  elimination  of  
export  subsidies. Some  countries  will  enjoy  tangible benefits  while  others  will  
endure  negative  consequences. 
 
This  thesis  focuses  on  the  policies  of  the  European  Union  and  its  Common  
Agricultural  Policy, in  particular  its  use  of  export  subsidies. By  no  means  is  the  
EU  alone  its  use  of  trade  distorting  support  measures, but  in  this context,  the  
relationship  between  the  European Union  and South  Africa  is  the  decisive  factor.  
How  has  European  agricultural  policy  impacted  on  South  Africa, seeing  as  the  
EU  is  South  Africa’s  biggest  trading  partner?  Will  the  reforms of the  European  
agriculture  sector  have any  significant  impacts  on  SA? 
 
And  what  about  South  Africa? Will  the  possible elimination  of export  subsidies  in  
agriculture  result  in  any  significant  benefits for  the  South  African  economy? What  
will the  impact  be  on  certain  agricultural  commodities  such  as  sugar?  
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Will  South  Africa, as  proponents  of  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  argue, 
benefit  in  terms  of  increased  export  revenue, increased  employment  within  the  
agricultural  sector  and  a general  improvement  in  the  welfare  of  many? Or  will  
the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  mean  that  South  Africans   will  have  to  pay  
more  for   certain  foodstuffs? 
 
2.EUROPEAN  UNION VIEWPOINTS  REGARDING  THE  COMMON  
AGRICULTURAL  POLICY  AND  THE  USE  OF  EXPORT  SUBSIDIES 
As  has  been  laid  out  in  the  previous  chapters, the  EU  agricultural  policies  are  
typical  of  the  agricultural  policies  pursued  by  the industrialised  nations. First  
world  countries  invest  vast  billions  in  economic  resources  into  the  agricultural  
sector. Developing  and  least  developed  countries  cannot  compete  on  this  
economic  scale  and  thus  the  agricultural  sectors  in  these  countries  have  to  make  
do   with  scarce  resources.  However  the  twist  in  the  tale,  is  that   many  of  the  
so-called  third  world  states  are  leading  producers  and  exporters   of  agricultural  
commodities. They  are  often  able  to  produce  their  respective  commodities  in  a  
more  efficient  and  cost-effective  manner  than  their  competitors   in  the  
industrialised  world.  The  market  for  agricultural  goods  is  really  the  only  
international  arena  where  developing  and  least  developed  states  can  outperform  
their  first  world  rivals. 
 
However  the   European  Union  is  an  entity  that  bucks  this  trend.  It  is  a  world  
leading  producer  of  a number  of  commodities  such  as  dairy  products, sugar, 
wheat, cereals  and  bovine  meat. It  seems  incongruous   that  the  European  Union  
should  be  such  a  significant  exporter  of  certain  agricultural  commodities.  
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The  geographical  situation  of  many  of  the  producers(tropical  goods  such  as  sugar  
produced  in  colder  climes  such a s  Sweden), the  fact  that  just  over  2%  of  the  
total  EU  workforce  is  employed  in  the  agricultural  sector  and  many  of  the  
commodity  producers  are  not  run  in  an  efficient  manner  are  factors which  would  
mitigate  against  the  EU  being  a  major  exporter  of  commodities. 
 
The  EU  agriculture  sector’s  existence  is  in  a large  part  thanks  to  the  Common  
Agricultural  Policy.  With  its  production  quotas, support  mechanisms and  generous  
support  payments, European  farmers  have  been  able  to  produce  bumper  harvests  
year  in  and  year  out. When  the   production  quotas  are  exceeded, surpluses  are  
simply  offloaded  onto  the  world  market  with  the  aid  of  export  subsidies. 
“ Agriculture  offers  a  classic  example  of  a  relatively  small  group  of  recipients  
being  provided  with  concentrated  benefits, while  the  costs  are  much  more  
diffused”  1 
And  further: 
“The  extent  of  the  influence  of  these  policies  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  
in the  EU  planting  and  investment  decisions  by  farmers  are  often  influenced  
by  developments  in  the  CAP…For  example, consumers  in  the  EU  are  rarely  
aware  of  how  much  higher  their  shopping  bill  is  because  the  CAP  leads  to  
European  prices  being  above  world  market  prices  for  agricultural  
commodities.2 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Cardwell M et  al, Agriculture  and  International  Trade  Law  Policy  and  the  WTO, Grant W, Chapter 3:  The  
Politics  of  Agricultural  Trade p51,para 3 
2 Supra…p 49 
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The  focus  of  this  thesis  is  to  expose  the  way  a  cog  in  the  CAP  machine  leads  
to  major  distortions in  the  world  trade  in  agricultural  commodities  namely: export  
subsidies. Although  export  subsidies  make  up  a  small  percentage  of  the  total  
CAP  support  system( about  3  billion  of  the  55  billion  euros  of  the  CAP  budget), 
the  eventual  elimination  of  export  subsidies  will  lead  to  benefits  for  agricultural  
producers  in  developing  countries. 
 
The  European  Union  has  for  many  years  resisted  calls  for  a  significant  reform of  
its  CAP  and  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies. However  increasing  pressure  on  
the  EU  at  WTO  Negotiation  Rounds  from  blocs  representing  developing  country  
interests  such  as  the  Cairns  Group  and  G-20, has  among  other  things, compelled  
the  Union  to  undertake  significant  reforms  of  its  agricultural  policies. 
“By  2003  it  became  clear  that  the  EU  could  not  take  part  in  the  WTO  
agreement  on  the  basis  of  Agenda  2000  package …This  would  indeed  not  be  
possible  without  reforming  the  CAP.”3 
The  European  Union  undertook  further  reforms  of  CAP  in  2003, yet  on  the  
question  of  export  subsidies  the  EU  remained  stead  fast  in  their  view  that  export  
subsidies  were necessary  to  support  its  local  farmers  due  to  the  low  world  prices  
for  certain  agricultural  commodities.  The  then  EU  Commissioner  for  Agriculture, 
Mr  Franz  Fischler  stated  that: 
“It  was  argued  that (reforms  of  CAP)  would  simplify  the  CAP, make  
production  more  market  orientated  and  enhance  the  compatibility  of  the  CAP  
with  the  WTO… Commissioner  Lamy ( Former  EU  Commissioner  for Trade)  
argued  that  with  a less  trade  distorting  support  system, the  EU  was  in  
apposition  to  take  renewed  commitments  in  the  Doha  Round.”       4 
                                                 
3 Garzon I, Reforming  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy- History  of  a  Paradigm  Change, p100 
4 Garzon I, Reforming  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy- History  of  a  Paradigm  Change, p105 
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The  current  EU  Commissioner  for  agriculture, Mrs  Marianne  Fischer  Boel,  in  a 
speech  to  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace  stated  that: 
“The  2003  reforms to  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy(CAP)  represented  an  
important  series  of  changes…the  single  payment  scheme was  created, which  
decoupled subsidies  from  production  targets  and  instead  based  payments  on  
past  receipts  and  current  land  area… payments  were  contingent  on  respect  for  
other  European  values  on  protection  of  the  environment  and  food  safety  and  
quality.”5 
Mrs  Fischer  Boel  went  on  further  to  say: 
“As  a result  of  this  reform, farmers  have  changed  their mindsets  and  now  
increasingly  look  to  the  market  rather  than  Brussels  in  making  decisions. 
Critics  of  the  CAP  can  no  longer  claim  that  productivity  regardless  of  price  
is  the  rule.”  6 
 
It  is  all  well  and  good  that  the  EU  has  undertaken  these  reforms, but  are  these  
reforms  of  benefit  to  anyone  outside  of  the  European  Union? The  most  pressing  
factors  that  brought  about  the  most  recent  CAP  reforms, was  the  growing 
expenditure  of  CAP(  close to  half  of  the  total EU  budget  devoted  to  CAP)  and  
the  fact  that  the  accession  of  new  Member  States  meant  that  more  resources  
would  have  to  be  devoted  to  CAP  since  many  of  the  new  Member  States  had  
quite  sizeable  agriculture   sectors. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 www.carnegieendowment.org , EU  Agriculture  in  Times  of  Globalisation, Friday  February  09  2007, p1( accessed  
on  27  September  2007) 
6 Supra…p1 para 2 
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And  on  the  international  trade front?  The  EU  use  of  export  subsidies  has  always  
proven  to  be  major  stumbling  block  when  it  come  to  WTO  negotiations.  
“The  removal  of  subsidies  to  agricultural  production, the ending  of  dumping  
surplus  food stocks  in  the  developing  world  and  the  removal  of  export  
subsidies  would  all  create  significant  economic and  social  consequences  for  the  
food  and  farming  sector  in  the  developed  world”    7 
The position  of  the  EU  when  it  comes  to  export  subsidies  is  interesting  to  note.  
It  is  somewhat  of  a quid  pro quo  situation. When  developing  nations  raise 
objections  to  EU  policy, the  standard  European  response  is along  the  lines  that   
developing  countries  should  first  liberalise  their  domestic  markets  with  regard  to  
industrial  products and  services  and  allow  European  products  to  enter  their  
markets. This  ignores  the  fact  that  in  most  instances, the  industrial  sectors  in  
these  developing  countries are  in  their  embryonic  stages  and  cannot  realistically  
compete  with  the  European  imports. 
 
When  the  EU  is  confronted  on  its  agricultural  policy  by  other  industrialised  or  
OECD  countries  especially  with  regard  to  export  subsidies,  the  European  
response  is  that  they  will  be  willing  to  introduce  significant  cuts  to  its  
agricultural  export  program  if  the  other  major  agricultural  exporters  such  as  the  
United  States  and  Japan  undertake  similar   reforms  and  cuts  of  their  export  
programs. 
“The WTO  negotiations  being  a matter  of  give  and  take, Mrs  Fischer  Boel  
stressed  that  the  time  has  come  for  other  WTO  players  to  give  in  on  other  
sectors  and  not  demand  more  from  the  EU  in  agriculture.” 8 
                                                 
7 www.euromove.org.uk , The  EU  and  the  Doha  Round  of  World  Trade  Talks, p2  para  2( accessed  on  23  
September  2007) 
8 EU  Commission, Directorate-General  for  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  Newsletter, Mrs  Fischer  Boel  
outlines  her  vision  for  the  CAP  at  Berlin’s ‘Green  Week’, no. 71 February-March  2005 
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And  further: 
“…The  EU  reiterates  that  the dismantling  of   agricultural  support  has  to  lead  
to  a  level  playing  field  among  developed  countries. The  EU  again  requests  
commitments  from  the  US  on  Food  Aid, export  credits  and  changes  to  the  
Blue  Box  criteria  and  from  Canada, New  Zealand  and  Australia  commitments  
on  State  Trading  Enterprises (STE).9         
The  European  position  is  understandable. Developing  and  least  developed  
countries  are  calling  on  reforms  that  will have  a  significant  impact  on  the  global  
agricultural  trade. This  cannot  be  realistically  achieved  if  only  the  EU  were  to  
undertake  the  required  reforms  of  its  agricultural  sector.  Although  the  EU  is  a 
major  player  in  global  agricultural  trade,  it  is  but  only  one  of  the  major  role-
players. The  EU  reforms  have  to  be  accompanied  by  equivalent  undertakings  by  
the  USA, Japan, Canada  and  other  first  world  countries. It  appears  that  major 
powers  such  as  the  EU  and  the  USA  are  engaged  in  a  game  of one-upmanship, 
with  each  new  reform  proposal  from  one  side  trying  to  outdo  the  other  and  
paint  it  in  positive  light. 
“The  EU, however, has  demonstrated  reluctance  in  making  such  trade  
concessions  unless  other  members, particularly  the  United  States, and  the  
Cairns Group, can  reciprocate  by  reconciling  issues  of  market  protectionism  for  
agricultural  and  industrial  goods  and  services. In  a recent  statement  in  
December  2006, Mandelson  (Peter  Mandelson, current  EU  Commissioner  for  
Trade) has  stated  that  the  EU  offer  to  eliminate  export  refunds  in  agriculture  
must  be  matched  by  a  phasing  out  of  all  forms  of export  subsidization  by  
other  members: ‘We  have  received  no  matching  offer  from  Australia, New  
Zealand, Canada  and  the U.S. We  shall  proceed  in  parallel  or  not  all.”10  
                                                 
9 www.trade.ec.europe.eu , Doha  Development  Agenda (DDA): Chronology, (accessed  on  3  October  2007) 
10 www.g7.utoronto.ca , Trade: Export  Subsidies  and  Agriculture, p119 para 3 (accessed  on  27  September  2007) 
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However  credit  should  be  given  to the  European  Union  for  taking  the  lead  in 
agricultural  reform  especially when  it  comes  to  the  issue  of  export  subsidies. Last 
minute  proposals  and  concessions  by  the  EU ‘saved’  the  Hong  Kong  Round  of  
WTO  negotiations in  2005. The  EU  has  increasingly  become  a  driving  force  for  
agricultural  reform  amongst  industrialised  nations. The  EU  got  the  ball  rolling  on  
significant  reform  in  2004  with  an  announcement  that  it  would  be  willing  to  
consider  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  by  an  unspecified  date  and  an  
undertaking  to  make  significant  cuts in  other  support  payments  and  subsidies. 
“On  1  August  2004,  WTO  members  adopted  a  General  Council  decision  on  
the  Doha  Work Programme  informally  known  as  the  Framework…Under  the  
package  wealthy  industrialized  countries  agreed  to  major  concessions... Wealthy  
states, in  particular  the  EU, agreed  to place  all trade  distorting  agricultural  
subsidies  on  the  table  for  discussion  and  committed  to  making  significant  
cuts; wealthy  countries  agreed  to  ‘down  payment’  on  this  deal  in  the  form of  
an  immediate  20%  reduction  in total current trade distorting agricultural 
subsidies.”  11 
The  2005  Hong Kong  WTO  Negotiation  Round  was  regarded as  a  success  only  
because  of  an 11th  hour  concession  by  the  European  Union. The EU  specified  a  
date for  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies, with  the  date  being  set  for  the  year  
2013.  As  emphasised  by  Commissioner  Mandelson  in  November  2005: 
“The  Doha  Round  is  too  big  to  fail.  It  is  not  just  about  trade.  It  is  about  
maintaining  the  credibility of  multilateral  cooperation  showing  that  multilateral  
institutions  can  find  global  answers  to  global  issues, proving  that  trade  can  be  
put  at  the  service  of  development.”12 
                                                 
11 Supra…p113, para 2 
12 www.trade.ec.europe.eu , Doha  Development  Agenda (DDA): Chronology, (accessed  on  3 October  2007) 
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So  the  Europeans  seem  to  have  committed  themselves  to  the  elimination  of  
export  subsidies  by  setting  an  end  date. Whether  or  not  the  EU  follows  through  
with  their  decisions  to  the  end  depends  on  other  variables  such   as  the  level  of  
support  within  the  EU  Member  States  for  the  reforms,  the  political  will  of  
Member  States  to  proceed  with  reforms  and  the  level  of  reduction  commitments  
and  concessions  by  other  countries  such  as  the  U.S.  with  regard  to  export  
support  for  farmers.   
“The  very  modest  outcomes  of  the  WTO  Ministerial  in Hong  Kong  makes  the  
year  2006  crucial. A  WTO  agreement  is  essential, in  particular  for  Europe. The  
reduction of  the  EU export  subsidies(and  of  the  equivalent  measures  used  by  
other WTO  Members) as  well  as  their  elimination  by  2013  will  bring an  
increase  in  economic  welfare  only  if  the  EU(and  other  WTO  Members) open  
their  agricultural  markets  by  reducing  substantially  their  tariffs and  internal  
support.”13 
 
3.THE ROLE OF  SPECIAL  INTERESTS  IN  DETERMINING EU  
AGRICULTURAL  POLICY 
It  has  only been in  the  last  three years  or  so  that  the  European  Union  has  taken  
concrete  steps  towards  addressing   the  grievances  of  developing  nations  with  
regard  to  agriculture. Why  has  the  EU  been  so  tardy  in  committing  to  significant  
reforms, if  agriculture  is  such  a  thorny  issue  in  international  trade  negotiations? 
Do  these  reforms  adequately  address  the  concerns  of  the  developing  world? 
 
                                                 
13 www.gem.sciences.pro.fr , Boulanger P, Export  Subsidies: An  Endangered  Species- Beyond  the  WTO  Hong  
Kong  Ministerial, p 4,para 2 
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A possible  answer  to  the  European  reluctance  to  overhaul  their  agricultural  
policies  is  the  fact  that  the  farming  lobby  represents  a  number  of  powerful  
groups  which  have  vested  interests  in  the  continued  EU  agricultural  policies. 
Having  grown  used  to  the  high  level  of  support  from  Brussels,  farmers  and  in  
particular  the  multinational  agri-business  corporations will  not  allow  the  reforms  
to  go  through  without  some  sort  of  protest  or  alternatively, the  reforms  are  
implemented  slowly  so  as  not  to  meet  the  deadlines imposed  by  the  European  
Commission. 
“In  Britain  groups  such  as  the  Countryside  Alliance  and  the  National  Farmers  
Union,  which  consists  mostly  of  large-scale  farmers, have  often  had  
considerable  influence  in  government circles.”  14 
And  further: 
“Farmers  score  well  with  the  public  and  this  in  turn  influences  policy…The  
strong  European  farming  lobby  has successfully  tapped  into  an  emotional  strain  
among  the  public, says  Christopher  Stevens  of the  Overseas  Development  
Institute, a  London-based  think-tank.  Many  people in  Europe  therefore  go  along   
with  the   view  that  a high  level  of  government  support  for farming  is  
necessary.”15 
 
The  farming  lobby  has  always  tried  to  paint  the  picture  that  CAP  support  
through  the  various  payments  is  essential in  ensuring   the  survival  of  the  rural 
way  of  life,  yet  little  attention  is  paid  to  the  fact  that  much  of  the  CAP  funds  
are  not  channelled  to  the  small  farmers, but  to  the  large agri-business  
corporations.  
  
                                                 
14 Madeley J, The Enduring  Racket:  Why  the  Rich  Won’t  Budge  on  Farm Subsidies, www.globalpolicyforum.org, 
July  28 2006 p3, para 3 (accessed  on  27  September 2007) 
15 Supra…p3 para 4 
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In  this  game, public  perception  is  vital  in  ensuring  the  continued  support  of  the  
farming  lobby. An  interesting  example  of  this  is the  lobbying  within  the  EU  
sugar  industry.( I  have  used  sugar  as  one  of  the  highlighted  commodities  in  this  
thesis). The  sugar  industry  in  Europe  is  one  agriculture  sector   that  is  in  urgent  
need  of  reform, yet  powerful  lobby  groups  have  resisted  these  reforms  at  every  
stage. 
“There is  a  growing  danger  that  corporate  interest  groups  will  exploit  the  
debate  about  reform  of  the  CAP  for  their  own  ends, overriding  public  interest  
in  the  pursuit  of  subsidised  profit. Sugar  processors  ad  large  farm   
organisations  have launched  a  Europe-wide  lobbying  effort  aimed  at  
perpetuating  the  current  system…British  Sugar  and  the  National  Farmer’s  
Union  are  attempting  to  sway  public  opinion  against  reform  behind  the 
populist  banner  of  a  ‘Save  Our  Sugar’ campaign.  That  campaign  is  built  on  
distortion  and  the  pursuit  of  self-interest.”    16 
 
As  I  have  stated  earlier,  the  European public’s  perception  of  how  their  various   
foodstuffs  are  produced  is very  important  to  the  Brussels  bureaucrats. A 
Eurobarometer   survey  was  conducted  in  25  Member  States, polling  about  26 000  
respondents  between  22  November  and  19  December  2004 (  after  the  introduction 
of  the  2003  CAP  reforms). The  purpose  of  the  survey  was  to   gauge  the views  
of  the general   public  about  the  CAP  and  the  associated  reforms. The  survey  
results  indicated   that  the  majority  of  respondents  were  willing to  support   the  
continued  funding  of  Europe’s  farmers. 
 
                                                 
16 www.seatini.org , Issue: Development, Cotton  and  Sugar, Volume 7 no 7, 30 April-15 May  2004, p8 para 3 
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“…first  Eurobarometer  survey  into  public  attitudes  to  the  CAP  conducted  in  
the  enlarged  EU…indicates  that  two  thirds  of  citizens  approve  of  the  current  
direction  of  agricultural  policy…EU  citizens  believe  that  directing  funds  
towards  the  protection  and  development  of  the  overall  rural  economy  and  for  
direct  support  to   farmers, is  a  good  thing.”17 
 
I  believe  EU  citizens have  the perception  that  the  majority  of  CAP  funding  is  
directed towards  the  countryside  and  the  rural  inhabitants, yet  as  I  have  pointed  
out  in  the   previous  chapter, large  agri-business  multinationals  are  the  largest  
beneficiaries  of  CAP  support  payments. In  a   article  published  in  July  2005, 
Marita  Wiggerthale  raised  an interesting  point  in   that  the  CAP  subsidies  are  not  
meant  to  benefit  the  farmers  products  such  as  milk  or  sugar  per  se,  but  rather  
the  secondary  or  processed  products which  contain the  agricultural  commodity  
such  as  cheese  or  confectionery.  
“The  EU  subsidies  were  not  applied  to  products  of  farmers, but  to  the  most  
important  products  of  the  big  co-operatives  and  the  food  industry. Which  
means  no  support  for  milk  of  the farmers, but  for  butter, skimmed  milk  
powder  and  cheese  of  the  dairy  industry…So  the  food  industry  and  the  big  
co-operatives  were  much  of  the  support  system  formerly  in  place, whereas  
family farms  benefited  less.” 18 
The  gist  of  Ms. Wiggerthale’s  article  is  that  CAP  payments  and  subsidies  should  
not  be  directed  towards  the  multinationals  but  rather  as  it  has always  been  
publicly  heralded, to  the  European  farmer. 
                                                 
17 European  Commission  Directorate-General  for  Agriculture and  Rural  Development , Strong  Support  for  the  
CAP  in  the  EU of  25, Newsletter  no  72  April  2005 
18 Wiggerthale M, What’s  wrong  with  EU  agricultural  subsidies?, p2 para 4 www.attac.de (accessed  13  September  
2007) 
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“Instead  of fuelling  an  anti-subsidy  debate,  we  need  to  focus  on  the  
reorientation  of  subsidies  towards  sustainable  agricultural  development  and  end  
detrimental  dumping ..that  subsidies  are  not  per  se  bad, to  the  contrary  they  
are  an  indispensable  instrument  to  provide  incentives for  needed policy  changes  
in  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy.”19 
In my  opinion, the  views  expressed  by  Ms.  Wiggerthale  are a  bit  naïve. It  would  
be  perfectly  reasonable  if  the  CAP  support  payments  were  indeed  directed  to  the  
small-scale  farmer. Yet in  reality  these  farmers receive only  a  small  percentage  of  
these  payments  directly. Nothing  in  the  past  history  of  CAP  indicates  that  the  
support  payments would  find  their  way  anywhere  else  but  to  the pockets of  the  
large  agri-business  corporations. 
 
The  European  Union  is  unique  in  the  history  of  multilateral  organisations. 
Member  States  have in  certain  policy  areas  ceded  their  sovereignty  in  decision  
making  to  EU, with agriculture  being  one  of  those  policy  areas. Yet  when  it  
comes  to  WTO  negotiations, some Member  States  are  not  willing  to   make  certain  
concessions  which  the  EU  Commission  may  think  is  necessary in order  to  reach  
a  compromise  in   the negotiations. At  the  2005  Hong  Kong  WTO negotiations, 
France  was  particularly  upset  with  the  EU  Commission’s  offer  to  end  export  
subsidies  and  make  significant  cuts  in  domestic support.  France  has  consistently  
been  intransigent  in  agricultural  negotiations  and  in  making  concessions  to  
developing  countries. The  French  agricultural  sector  is  immensely  powerful and 
able  to  exert  a  lot  of  influence  in  political  circles. With  regard  to  export  
subsidies, France  was  at  its  most  defensive.  
 
                                                 
19 Wiggerthale M, What’s  wrong  with  EU  agricultural  subsidies?,p1 para 1, www.attac.de (accessed  on  13  
September  2007) 
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 When  the  EU  Commission  made  the proposal  to  end  export  subsidy  use  by  
2013,  France  accused  the  Commission  of  exceeding  its  negotiating  mandate. 
“To  EU  governments  and  farmers  such  as  Mr. Fievez, however  the  tension  
between  these  subsidies  and  the  ideals  of  sustainable development  in  poorer  
countries  is less  of  an  issue  than  political  pressure, social  stability  and  
financial  security  at  home” 20 
And  further: 
“The  text  of  the  accord  on  agriculture  agreed  at  the  start  of  the  Doha  Round  
commits  the  participants  to  comprehensive  negotiations  aimed  at  reductions  of; 
with  a  view to  phasing  out, all  forms  of  export  subsidies…This  clause  was  
seen  by  CAP  traditionalists  as  striking  a  blow  at  the  very  heart  of  European  
farm  policy, and  France, backed  by  Ireland, signalled  its  willingness  to  bring  
down  the  whole  Doha  meeting  rather  than  agree  to  it  without  qualification.”21 
 
4.HOW  DOES  THE  MULTIFUNCTIONALITY  ISSUE  APPLY  TO  EUROPEAN  
AGRICULTURE? 
As  stated  earlier, the  majority  of  Europeans  continue to  support  CAP  and  its  
associated  policies. What  it  is  interesting  from  the  Eurobarometer  and  other  
surveys  conducted, is  the  emphasis  Europeans  now  place  on  food  security,  the  
quality  of  the  foodstuffs  produced  as  well  as  the  protection  of  the  environment. 
“  30%  of  respondents  want  agricultural  products  that  are  healthy  and  safe  and  
28%  want  CAP  policies  to  promote  respect  for  the  environment.”22 
 
 
                                                 
20 Thurow R  and  Winestock  G, Addiction  to  Sugar  Subsidies  Chokes  Poor  Nations  Exports, p1 
21 Cardwell M  et al , Agriculture  and  International  Trade Law  Policy  and  the  WTO, p58 
22 EU  Commission  Directorate-General for  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  Newsletter  no  72  April  2005, 
Strong  Support  for  the  CAP  in  the  EU  of  25 
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These  viewpoints  are  playing  an  ever  more  prominent  role  when  CAP  reforms  
are  discussed.  They  fit  into  the  argument  that  agriculture  in  Europe  performs  a  
multifunctional  role  within  society. Agriculture  and  CAP  policies  have  a  role  to  
play  in  ensuring  sustainable  incomes  for  the  rural  areas  of  Europe,  ensuring  food  
security, maintaining  food  quality  standards  and  ensuring  the  protection  of  the  
environment.  
Multifunctionality  in  agriculture  has  been  described  as: 
“…has  been  suggested as  a ‘new  paradigm’  for  European  agriculture  and  rural  
development, requiring ‘a fundamental  rethinking  of  the  position  of  agriculture 
within  society’ and ‘a  complete  rethinking of  the  institutional  system  
surrounding  agriculture. Whether  this  is  be  true  or  not, it  is  a  concept  which  
has  attracted  increasing  interest  and  attention-within the  EU and  beyond.”  23 
 
The  argument  that  agriculture  in  Europe  serves  a  multifunctional  role  in  society  
has  steadily  gained  credence. The argument  that the  role  of  CAP  extends  beyond  
more  than  just  providing  billions  in  subsidies  to  farmers  is  a  very  attractive  one  
to  the  supporters  of  EU  agricultural  policy. If  it  can  be  shown  that  the  continued  
financial  support  for  agriculture  within  Europe  is  necessary   to  ensure  food  
quality and  safety  standards as well as  ensuring  that  the  environment  is  protected   
(very  relevant  in  light  of issues  such  as  global  warming  and  sustainable  
development), this  will  go  a  long  way  in  ensuring  continued  public  support.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Thomson K, Agricultural  Multifunctionality  and  EU  policies: Some  Cautious  Remarks, p 3 para 4 
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“…the  reform  process  has  been  in  part  a  response  to  the  changing  public  
perceptions  of  the  role  of  agriculture…the  EC Comprehensive negotiating  
Proposal  expressly  articulated that, to  meet  the  goals  of  further  liberalisation  
and  expansion  of  trade  of  agricultural  products,’ it  is  vital  to  muster  strong  
public  support  which  can  only  be  achieved if  other  concerns  are met in  
particular  the  multifunctional  role  of  agriculture.”24 
 
Of  course the  multifunctionality  argument  is  a godsend  to  those  in  the  EU  
agriculture  sector  who  support  the  continued  use  of  export  subsidies. They  can  
argue  that as  part  of  the  measures  which  support  agriculture, export  subsidies  
should  be  retained.  Their  elimination  will  place  farming  communities  in  a  more  
precarious  financial position, leading  to  an  erosion  of  the  countryside  and  the rural 
way  of  life. 
 
5.WORLD  TRADE  ORGANISATION  NEGOTIATIONS: WHAT  ARE THE  
NEGOTIATING  POSITIONS  OF  THE  MAJOR  TRADE  BLOCS? 
The  major  blocs  and  cliques  within  the  WTO  are unanimous in  their  view  that  
export  subsidies  within  agriculture should  be  eliminated.  As  the  European  Union  
is  the dominant  user  of  export  subsidies  in the  world - almost  90%  of  the  total  
amount  of  export  subsidies  utilised, it  is  the  bloc  which  is  singled  out  for  the  
most  criticism  by  the  other   major  groupings  within  the  World  Trade  
Organisation. It  would  seem  that  since  the  2005  Hong  Kong Ministerial, all the  
major  WTO  groupings  are  reading  from  the  same  page  when  it  comes  to  export  
subsidies  and  other  support  payments: namely  that they  should  be  eliminated.  
                                                 
24 Cardwell M et al, Agriculture  and  International  Trade  Law  Policy  and the  WTO: Multifunctionality  of  
Agriculture: EU Perspective, p152 
 
 
 
 
 77
However  this  is  where  the  similarity  ends. Divergent  views  exist  with  regard  to 
the  timetable  for  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies, what  disciplines  should  be  
imposed to  regulate  quasi  export  subsidies  such  as  export  credit, food  aid  and  
State  Trading  Enterprises (STE)  and  what  concessions  the  developing  world  
should  reciprocate as  a  result  of  the  EU  decision  to end  the  use  of  export  
subsidies. 
 
The  major  players  in  WTO  negotiations  has  always  been  the  European  Union, 
the  United States  and  other  industrialised  states  such  as  Canada  and  Japan. 
However  over  the  last  twenty  years  or  so  the  position  of  the  developing  world  
has  steadily  grown into  a  powerful  one  at  WTO  negotiations.  This  was  reflected  
by  the  formation  of  the  G-20  prior  to  the  2003  Cancun  Ministerial.  At  Cancun, 
the  developing  world  was  able  to  flex  its  muscles in  the  area  of  agricultural  
trade. Cancun  ended  unsuccessfully  due  in  large part to  the  developing  countries  
unwillingness  to  bow  to  developed nations  demands  for  increased  market  
liberalisation  without  substantial  reform  in  the  agricultural  sphere.  
 
The  major  groupings  which  have  emerged  in terms  of  developing  country  interests  
are  the  G-20 and  the  Cairns  Group. Additional   groupings  exist  such  as  the  G-33  
as  well  as  the G-90. On  the  side  of  the developed  nations, the  major  blocs  are  the  
European  Union  and  the  United  States. In  some  blocs there  is  overlapping  
membership. For  instance  Brazil  is  member  of  the  Cairns  Group  as  well  as  the  
G-6( which  includes  the  EU  and  the  US).  
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“The  G-33( group  of  developing  countries )  remains  committed  to  engage  
constructively  with  all  WTO  members  to  secure  their  development  concerns  in  
the  Doha  outcomes, while  specifically  addressing  the  livelihood  concerns of  
small, poor  and  vulnerable  farmers  worldwide…”   25 
 
With  regard  to  the stance  assumed  by  South  Africa  with  regard  to  agricultural  
reform by  the  EU, I  will  be  referring  to  the  views  expressed  by  the  Cairns  
Group  as  well  as  the  G-20  since  South  Africa , as  member  of  both  groupings,  
has  a prominent  role  to  play  due  to  the  fact  that  it  is  a significant  exporter  of  
agricultural  commodities.  Any  reform in  agricultural  trade by  the  industrialised  
entities  such  as  the  EU will  be  of  major  significance  to  South Africa. 
“The  South  African  trade  minister, Mandisi  Mpahlwa, told  IPS  that ‘ all  African  
countries  want  a formal  launch  of  Doha trade  negotiations…a  multilateral  
outcome  is  the  best  option, then  informal  negotiations.”  26 
 
6.CAIRNS  GROUP  PROPOSAL  REGARDING  AGRICULTURAL  REFORM I.E.  
THE  ELIMINATION  OF  EXPORT  SUBSIDIES 
The  Cairns  Group  is   made  up  countries  which  are  major  agricultural  commodity  
producers  and  consumers. In  most  instances  the  producers  in  these  countries  are 
on  a par, if  not  better  than  there  counterparts in  the  industrialised  world  in  terms  
of  cost-efficiency  and  quality. Within  this  grouping, Brazil, Australia, Thailand  and  
South  Africa  are  the  leading  lights. With  regard to  the  issue  of export  subsidy  
use, the  Cairns  Group  has  been  clear  in  its  stance  that  their  use  should  be  
eliminated. 
                                                 
25 www.globalpolicy.org , Devarakonda R, World  Economic Forum: G-33  Pushes  Trade  Powers  on  Farm  Issues, p1 
para  2 (accessed  on  26 September 2007) 
26 Supra…p1 para 6 
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“ According  to  para 6  of  the  Hong  Kong  Ministerial  Declaration, we  have  
agreed  to  ensure  the  parallel elimination  of  all  forms  of  export  subsidies  and  
disciplines  on  all  export  measure with  equivalent  effect  to  be  completed  by  
the  end  of  2013. This  will  be  achieved  in  a progressive  manner, to  be  specifies  
in  the  modalities, so  that  a substantial  part  is  realised  by  the  end  of  the  first  
half  of  the  implementation  period.”27 
The  attention of  the  Cairns  Group  is  not  focused  solely  on  the  use  of  direct  and  
indirect  export  subsidies, but  also  measures  such  as  food  aid  and  export  credit, 
which  may  potentially  be  used  as a means to  circumvent  the  WTO  regulations  
regarding  the  use  of  export   subsidies. 
“It  also  proposes  that  rules  should  be  tightened  to  ensure  that  export  credits 
and  food  aid  are  not  used  to  circumvent  commitments  to  remove  export  
subsidies, without  reducing  the  availability  of  genuine  food  aid  to  meet  the  
humanitarian  needs.”  28 
 
The  Cairns  Group proposal  regarding  export  subsidies  is  essentially  one  of  a  
gradual  and  staggered  reduction  of  export  subsidies. This  represents  quite  a  
sensible  approach  by  the  group.  They  are  not  calling  for an  overnight elimination 
of   export  subsidies  but  rather  that  they  should  be  reduced  in  stages  over  a period 
from  January  2008 to  December  2013. In  the  first  year  of  the   implementation  
period, Member  countries  would  have  to eliminate  50%  of  their  export  subsidies. 
This  initial  cut  has  to  be  followed  by  3  successive  cuts  of  10%  annually.  The 
remainder  of  the  export  subsidies  has  to  be  eliminated  by  the  end  of  2013. 
 
 
                                                 
27 Committee on Agriculture  Special  Session, Schedule  for  the  Elimination  of  all  Forms  of  Export Subsidies: 
Joint  G-20 – Cairns  Group  Contribution, p1 para 1 
28 Andrews N et al, Agriculture  in  the  Doha Round, p40 
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“In  this  regard, export  subsidies  as  specified  in  each  Member’s  Schedule, 
according  to  Article  9.1  of  the Agreement  on  Agriculture  will  be  eliminated  
by  the  end  of  2013, based  on  values  and  quantities  on  a product-specific  basis. 
Elimination  commitments  shall  be  undertaken  on an  annual  basis  for  each  
product.”29 
 
It  does  not  require  a degree in  rocket  science to  understand  the negotiating  
position  of  the  Cairns  Group.  The  elimination  of  export  subsidies  will  primarily  
affect  the  European  Union. The  EU is  the  major  export  market  for many  of  the  
Cairns  Group  countries.  If  export  subsidies  were  to  be  eliminated, European  
producers  would  have  no  incentive  to  overproduce. With  no surpluses  to  offload  
onto  world  markets, the  world  price  for  agricultural  commodities  will  increase.  
This  will  mean  an  increase  in  export  revenue  for  many  of  the  Cairns  Group  
countries.  Some  may  be  able  to  benefit  from the elimination  of export  subsidies  
more  than  others  such  as  Brazil  because  its  agricultural  sector  can  produce  
enough  to  meet  the  demand  of  the  export market  at   a  lower  cost.  In  the  case  of  
the  European Union, if the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  is  coupled  with  a  
decrease  in  the  tariff  levels, Cairns  Group  exporters  can  increase  their  exports  to  
the EU  and  thus  exploit  the  advantage  they  have  over  their  European rivals i.e.  
their  products  are  cheaper  than their European  counterparts. 
 
The  Cairns  Group  has  also  made  proposals  regarding  issues  such  as  the  
provision  of  food aid,  the  use  of  export  credits  and  State  Trading  Enterprises.   
 
 
                                                 
29 Committee  on  Agriculture  Special  Session, Schedule  for  the Elimination  of all  Forms  of  Export  Subsidies: 
Joint  G-20 –Cairns  Group  Contribution, p1,para 2 
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These  instruments  may  not  expressly  fall  into  the  same  category  as  direct  export  
subsidies  per  se, but  they  potentially have  the same  effect as  export  subsidies  i.e.  
distortions  within  world  agricultural  trade.  The  proposals  by  the  Cairns  Group  
essentially  calls  for  disciplines  and  guidelines  to  be   put  in  place  in  order  to  
regulate  the  use  of  these  instruments.  
• Food  Aid: The  Cairns  Group  proposal  wants  to  ensure  that  any  provision  of  food  
aid  is not  used  as  a  means  of  dumping  surplus  subsidised  foodstuffs. The  food  
aid  must  be  used for  its intended  purpose: namely  for  humanitarian  reasons.  
      “…including  the  prohibition  of  food  aid  tied  directly  or  indirectly  to  
commercial  exports  of all  commercial  goods  and  services  to  recipient  countries  
and  the  prohibition  of food  aid  linked  to  market  development  objectives  of  the  
donor  Member…”   30 
• Export  credits: The  provision  of  export  credits  by  national authorities  can  be  used  
to  circumvent  the  WTO  commitments  regarding  the  use  of  export  subsidies  if  
the credit  is  provided  at  a cheaper  rate  or  at  more  favourable  terms  than  would  
be  normally  obtained. The  Cairns  Group proposal  regarding  export  subsidies  is: 
“Additional  and  specific disciplines  shall  be  phased  in  from  the  first  day  of  
the  implementation  period  of  the  Doha  Round. Non-conforming export  credits, 
export  credit  guarantees  and  insurance  programmes  shall  be  eliminated  within  
the  binding  levels  of  Member’s  export  subsidies  elimination  schedules.” 
 
The  Cairns  Group  has  had  little  to  say  over  State  Trading  Enterprises,  besides  
calling  for  disciplines  to  be  imposed  on  their  operation  during  the  
implementation  period  of  the  Hong  Kong  declaration. 
 
                                                 
30 Committee on Agriculture  Special  Session, Schedule  for  the  Elimination  of  all  forms  of  Export  Subsidies- Joint  
G-20-Cairns  Group  Contribution, p1 para 3 
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7.PROPOSALS  PUT  FORWARD  BY  THE  G-20  REGARDING  
AGRICULTURAL  TRADE REFORM. 
The  G-20  in  2005  called  for  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  within  five  
years. The  stance  of  the  G-20  is  to  be  expected  since  its  membership  is  made  
up  exclusively  of  developing  countries. Export subsidies,  in  the  view  of  many  
developing  countries, is one of  the  three  policies  pursued  by  the  developed  world  
negatively  impacting  on  their  agriculture sectors (  the  other  two   being  market 
access  and  domestic  support). 
“Other  leading  members  of  the  alliance, formed  in  2003  to  seek  a  better  deal  
for  third-world  farmers,  include  Brazil, China  and  South  Africa.  The  G-20  
accounts  for  65%  of  the  world’s population, 72%  of  its  farmers  and  22% of  
agricultural  output.”31 
 
As  we  can  see from  the  statistics,  the  G-20  is  a  significant  role-player in  world  
trade  circles. The  proposals  put  forward  by  the  G-20  is  not  too  dissimilar   to  the  
Cairns  Group proposals  for  export  reform. As  stated  the  G-20  wants  to  see an  
end  to  export  subsidies   within  five  years i.e.  by  the  end  of  2010.  
“…that  direct export  subsidies be  eliminated  over  five  years, with  60%  at  the  
end  of  the  first  year, 20%  at  the  end  of  the  third  year  and  the  remainder   at   
the  end  of  the  fifth  year.”32 
The  G-20  proposal  calls for  a  speedier  elimination  of   export subsidies  than  the  
Cairns  Group. The  proposal  envisages  a  more  rapid  timetable  for  the  final  
elimination  of  export  subsidies  as  put  forward  by  the  European  Union. 
                                                 
31 www.comcom.co.za , Rakhudu M, An  Overview  of  the  WTO  6TH  Ministerial  Meeting  in  Hong  Kong, p1 para 3 
32 www.twnside.org , Khor  M, Review  of  different  positions  in   WTO  Agriculture  Negotiations- 4  August  2005,p 
2 para 4 (accessed  on  2 October  2007)  
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“G-20  Framework  Proposal…Export  subsidies  on  products of  particular  interest  
to  developing  countries  would  be  eliminated  over a longer period.”  33 
 
The  reform   proposals  of  the  G-20  extends  to  the  use  of  export  credits  and  food  
aid  as well.  In  this  respect  however, the  G-20  does  not  provide  specific  proposals  
regarding these  two  issues. The  G-20  only  calls  for  disciplines  to  be  imposed  in  
order  to  govern  the  use  of  these  instruments. 
“The  G-20  called  for  the  implementation  of  disciplines  on  a  rules  based  
approach  in  order  to  identify  and  eliminate  the  subsidy  component  of  export  
credits, export  credit  guarantees and  insurance  programmes.”  34 
And  further: 
“The  G-20  also  proposed  that  all  other  forms  of  export  subsidies  shall  be  
eliminated  and  disciplines  shall  be  in  force  on  equivalent  measures  by  the  
same  end  date.”35 
 
8.SOUTH  AFICAN  VIEWS  REGARDING  GLOBAL  AGRICULTURAL  
REFORM 
South  Africa is  a member  of  both  the  Cairns  Group  as  well  as the  G-20, so  
whatever  position  these  two  blocs  assume, will  be  supported  by  the  South  
African  authorities. The  overriding  policy  mantra  of  the  South  African 
government, is  to  approach  the  question  of  global  agricultural  reform   through  
multilateralism. 
 
 
                                                 
33 Andrews N et al, Agriculture  in  the  Doha  Round, p43 
34 Andrews N et al, Agriculture  in  the  Doha Round ,p43 para  3                   
35 www.twnside.org , Khor M,  Review  of  different  positions  in the  WTO Agriculture  Negotiations- 4  August 
2005,p 2 para 5 (accessed on 2  October  2007) 
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“…clearly  support    South  Africa’s objective  at  the  multilateral  level  to  
facilitate  a  substantial, real  reduction  in  trade-distorting  domestic  support. The  
target  is  that  those  countries  competing   with  each  other  on  world  markets  
should  have  more  or less  the  same  Producer  Support  Equivalent  resulting  in  a 
so-called ‘level  playing  field.”36 
South  Africa, as  a  member  of  the  Cairns  Group  and  the G-20,  has  predictably  
called  for  the end  of  export  subsidy  use  in  agricultural  trade. South  Africa  has  
also  made  proposals  regarding  market  access  and  domestic  support  by  
industrialised  countries. 
“Finally , on  this  front  we  hope  that  negotiations  will resume  soon  ensuring  
that  the laudable  objectives  agreed  upon  by  the  Doha  Development  Round  can  
be  achieved. South  Africa  is  ready  to  resume  the   negotiations  and  we  hope  
that  the  major  trade  partners  have  the  necessary  political  will  to  take  difficult  
political  decisions  to  ensure  a  speedy  resumption of the  negotiations.”  37 
 
With  regard  to  the  relationship  between the  European Union  and  South  Africa, the  
issue  of  trade  is  largely  regulated  in  terms of  the  Trade, Development  and  
Cooperation  Agreement (TDCA). The TDCA  does  not  expressly  mention  the  issue  
of  agricultural  export  reform, but  it does  make  provision  for  a  review  of  the  
agreement  after  five  years  of  operation. This  review  is  important  considering  the  
monetary  impact  the  agricultural  trade  between  South  Africa  and  the  EU  has. 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Address  by  the  Minister of  Land  Affairs, Ms Lulu  Xingwana-28  July  2006, p3 
37 Address  by  Minister  for  Land  Affairs, Ms  Lulu  Xingwana. 
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“The  Agreement  plays  a vital  role  in  improving  the  export  potential  of  
agricultural  products  to  the  EU. From  2004  to  2005, exports  of  these  products  
to  the  EU  increased  from  R10 885  million  to  R10  973  million. In  2005  South 
African  exports of  agricultural  products  to  the  EU had  a 42%  share  of  total  
agricultural  exports  to  the  rest  of  the  world.”38 
With  regard  to  a specific  agricultural  commodity, namely  sugar,  the  South  African  
authorities  have  consistently  called  on  their  European  counterparts  to  enact  
reforms  so  as  to  bring  the  EU  sugar  regime  in  line  with  global  standards. This  
entails  calling  for   an  end  to  the  use  of  export  subsidies  to  dump  excess  quota  
sugar  onto  the  world  market , a  reduction  in  the  level  of  support  and  production  
payments  to  European  farmers  and  a  lowering  of  the  import  tariff  levels  so  as  
to allow  major  sugar  producers  in  the  developing world  access  to  the  EU  market  
and  not  just  those  benefiting  under  the  EBA  initiative. 
“…widely  accepted  that developing  countries  are  seriously  hampered  by  the  
high  level  of  protectionism  that  still  exists   in  the  developed  north, which  
distorts  markets  and  drives  world  market  prices  down  to  levels  often  below  
production  costs, making  it  impossible  for  cost  competitive  producers  to  
survive  without  financial  support  from  their  governments  who  cannot afford  
subsidies.”39 
And further: 
“These  countries only  hope  of  raising  their  standard  of  living  is  through  freer 
and  fairer  trade. Instead  the  reverse  is  happening, with  some  African  countries  
                                                 
38 Supra…p4 para 1 
39 www.info.gov , Address  by  Alec  Erwin (then  Minister  for  Trade  and  Industry)  Opening  Ceremony- 21st  
International  Sugar  Organisation- 28  May  2002  para 4 ( accessed  on  2  August  2007)  
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virtually abandoning  large-scale  agricultural  production  under  the  pressure  of  
these  unfair  subsidies.”40 
 
9.CAN  THE  POSSIBLE  ELIMINATION  OF  EXPORT  SUBSIDIES  LEAD  TO  
NEGATIVE  CONSEQUENCES  FOR  CERTAIN  COUNTRIES  AND  SECTORS. 
Generally  speaking  the  total  elimination  of  export  subsidies  would  be  a good  
thing.  However  according  to  two  simulation  models, the  elimination  of  export  
subsidies would  also  lead  to  negative  results  for  certain  sectors  and  countries.  
Whether  or  not  a  country  experiences  adverse  consequences  will  greatly  depend  
on  whether  the  country  is  a  net  importer of  foodstuffs  or  an  exporter.  As  I  said  
certain  categories  of  society  will  either  benefit  or  lose  out  if  export  subsidies  are  
eliminated. These  particular groups  are  the  producers  and  consumers  in  developed  
as  well  as  developing  countries.  
 
Certain  countries  may  benefit  more  from  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  and  
other  countries  may  actually  lose  rather  than  gain. Although  most  countries  with  a  
significant agricultural  economy  stand  to  gain  from  the  elimination  of  export  
subsidies, some  such  as  Brazil, India, South  Africa etc. may  be  able  to  turn  their  
natural  advantages  in  agricultural  commodity  production   i.e.  low cost  production  
into  tangible  economic  benefits.  Countries  which  stand  to  possibly  lose  out  are  
mostly  what  one  would  consider  a  Least  Developed Country( LDC). The  most  
significant  impact  for  these  LDC’s  is  the  fact  that  since  many of  them  are  net  
importers  of  foodstuffs,  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  would  lead  to  an  
increase  in  the  world  price  for certain  staple  foodstuffs, thus increasing  the  cost  of  
living  in  these  countries. 
                                                 
40 Supra…para 5 
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The   impact  of  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  also  varies  according  to  the  
particular  agricultural  commodity. For  instance,  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  
for  bovine  meat, dairy  and  sugar  would  be  generally  welcomed, with significant  
improvements  in  the  world  price. Yet  with  regard  to  wheat  and other  cereal  
commodities,  the  export  subsidy  elimination  could  actually  result  in  a negative  
impact  on  global  welfare. 
 
For  the  consumer  in  both  developed  and  developing  countries,  the elimination  of  
export  subsidies  will  result  in  an  increase  in  the  price  of  foodstuffs, particularly  
in  the  short-term.  This  is  particularly  evident  in  South  Africa, where  there  has  
been  an  increase  in  the  price  of certain  staple  foods  such  as  bread, milk, maize  
meal etc. over  the  past  year.  The  question  is: are  consumers  willing  to  fork  out  
more  for  their  food  in  the  knowledge  that  they  are  supporting  their  domestic  
agricultural  producers  or  would  they  prefer  paying  for  cheaper  subsidised  
foodstuffs  and  commodities  imported  from  the  European  Union? Are  consumers  
willing  to  bite  the  bullet  when  it  comes  to  paying  for  their  food? 
 
A  further  issue  to  be  resolved  is  whether  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  will  
in  fact lead  to  significant  gains  to  producers  and  consumers  in  the  developing  
world.  This  is  important  if  you  consider  that  export  subsidies  is  but  only  one  
cog  in  the  machine  used  by  the  industrialised  world , such  as the  European Union,  
to  support  its  agriculture  sectors. By  eliminating  export  subsidies, will this  lead  to  
the  gains  expected  by  the  developing  world? How  significant  will  the  impact be  
if  export subsidy  use  is  adequately  addressed, yet nothing significant is done  
regarding  market  access  and  domestic  support? 
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10.THE  OUTCOMES  OF  THE SIMULATION  MODELS  REGARDING  THE 
ELIMINATION  OF  EXPORT  SUBSIDIES 
Both  the  OECD  and  the  United  Nations( through UNCTAD Agricultural  Trade  
Policy  Simulation  Model  or  ATPSM)  have  conducted  simulation  models  to  
analyse  the  impact  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  in  agriculture  will  have. 
The  major  conclusions  of  these  studies  is  that  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  
would  lead  to an  improvement  in  the  welfare  of  most  sectors  in  society.  The  
groups  which  stand  to  benefit  most  are the   producers  in  the  developing  world  
and  the  consumers in  the  developed  world.  The  producers  in  the  developing  
world  gain  because  their  domestic  markets  will  not  be  flooded  by  subsidised  
imports  and  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies will lead  to  an  increase  in  the  
world  price  for  most  commodities  thus  increasing  their  export  revenues. 
 
For  consumers in  the  developed  world,  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  means  
that  they  will  be  able  to  reduce  their  cost  of  living.  Take  for  example  the  
European Union, the  Europeans  will  have  to  fork  out  less  to  support  CAP  since  
there  will  be  no need  to  provide  export  subsidies. The  EU  Commission would  be  
able  to  wipe  off  about  three  billion  euros  in  expenditure  on  export  subsidies. 
“Major  winners  are  producers  in  agricultural exporting  countries  such  as  Cairns  
Group  members, producers  in  other developing  countries  and  consumers  and  
taxpayers  in  developed  countries”    41 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 Peters R, Roadblock to  Reform: The  Persistence  of  Agricultural  Export  Subsidies, p3 para 2   
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The  positive  impacts   of  export  subsidy  elimination  does  not  end  there  for  
developing  countries: 
“…developing  countries  would  benefit  from  liberalizing  their  own  markets  and  
the  elimination  of  export subsidies  would  make  this  more  feasible  without  
costly  adjustments. Furthermore, a  reinforcement  of  the  rural  population, which  
depends  heavily  on  agricultural  production  and  is  in  general  disproportionately  
poor, may  contribute  to  poverty  alleviation.”42 
The  general  results  of  the  UNCTAD  study  is  summed  as follows: 
“Globally, the  total  welfare  effect  is  positive, but  some  countries  lose  while  
others  gain. In  highly  protecting  developed  countries  consumers  and  taxpayers  
gain, producers  lose  and  the  overall  welfare  effect  is  positive.  In most  
developing  countries  producers  gain, whereas  consumers  lose  as  the  result  of  
higher  domestic  prices. The  overall welfare  effect  varies  from  country  to  
country, depending  on  the  production  and  trade  structure.” 43 
 
As  I  have  stated  earlier, some  developing  countries  may  be  able  to  take  a  bigger  
slice  of  the  world  market  due  to the  elimination  of  export  subsidies. Major  
exporters  such as  Brazil, India, South  Africa, Thailand  may  be  able  to  increase  
their  export  revenue  from  agricultural  commodities.  This  increase  may  however  
come  at  the  expense  of  other  developing  countries  or  for  that  matter  Least  
Developed  Countries. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Supra…p3 para 6 
43 Supra…p24 para 1 
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“Although  there  is  a general expectation  that  agricultural trade  reforms  which  
raise  world   food prices  and  increase  export  market  opportunities  are  in  the  
overall  interest  of  developing  countries, however the developing  countries  are  
not  a  homogenous  group.”   44 
It  seems  odd  to  say   that  developing  countries  have  actually  benefited  from  the  
use  of  export  subsidies  by  the  industrialised  world. But they have. This is  
particularly  the  case  with  Least  Developed  Countries. These  countries  are net  
importers  of  food  and  they  have benefited  from  the  low   cost   of  foodstuffs  due  
to  export  subsidies. These  countries  have  become  so  dependent  on  food  imports  
from  primarily  the  European Union  and  the  United  States  that  their  own  
agricultural  sectors  have  gone  into  decline  and  cannot  meet  the  consumption  
needs  of  the  local  population. Yet  these  countries  have  realised  that  the long  term  
benefits  of  agriculture  reform  outweigh  the  short-term  gains  from  cheap  
foodstuffs.  
“What  is  most  interesting  about  this  conflict  though  is  that  least  developed  
countries  and  net  food  importing  countries  have  sided  with  the  latter  in  
favour  of  eliminating  export  subsidies. Consumers  in  these  countries actually  
benefit  from  lower  food  prices  so  it  would  seem that  they  should  support  
these  subsidies. One  potential reason  for  this  seemingly  irrational  position  is  
that  governments  in  these  countries  might  disproportionately  value  the  welfare  
of  agricultural  producers, who  unambiguously  lose  in  this  situation.”45 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Milner C, Agricultural export  subsidies  and  Developing  countries  interests, p35  para 3 
45 www.itd.org , Smith A, Agriculture  Subsidies  and  the  Fate  of  the  Developing  World, p2 para 3 (accessed on  27  
September  2007) 
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And  further: 
…the  long  term  interest  of  developing  countries  lies  in undistorted  world  
policies and  better  access  for  their  exports  to  industrial country  and  developing  
country  markets. This  would  imply  that  they  should  accept  the  EU’s  offer  and  
push  for  the  elimination  of  all  export  subsidies.” 46 
 
Some  commentators  and  economic  experts   however, hold  a  pessimistic  view  
regarding  the  impact  agricultural  reform  will  have  on  developing  and  in  
particular, least  developed  countries.  Professor  Jagdish  Bhagwati,  a senior  
economics  professor  at  Columbia  University, has   stated  that  although   agricultural  
subsidies  should  be  eliminated,  he  does  not  believe  that  their  elimination  will  
lead  to  any  significant  improvements  for  developing  nations. In  fact  the  
elimination  of  subsidies  will  increase  the  burdens  on  these  countries, especially  if  
they  are  net  importers of  foodstuffs. 
“Agricultural  subsidies  are  certainly  undesirable.  But  the  claim  that  removing  
them  will  help the  poorest  countries  is ‘dangerous  nonsense’ and a  ‘pernicious’  
fallacy.”    47 
Professor  Bhagwati’s  views  are  supported  by  Arvind  Panagariya.  The  main  thrust  
of  their arguments  regarding  agriculture  reform  is  not  against  the  elimination  of  
export  and  other  subsidies  itself, but against  the  belief  that   the  elimination  of  
subsidies  in  agriculture  will  definitely  result  in  gains  for  the  developing  world.  
The  argument  often  presented  to  support  this  conclusion  is  that  the  elimination  of  
export subsidies  will  lead  to  an  increase  in  world  prices  for  agricultural  
commodities.  This  in  turn  leads  to  an  increase  in  the  price  of  foodstuffs. This  is  
an  increase  that  many  least developed  countries  can ill-afford. 
                                                 
46 Milner C, Agricultural  export  subsidies  and  Developing  countries  interests, p36 para 1   
47 www.globalpolicy.org , Sharma D, Bhagwati, Globalisation  and  Hunger-March  29 2005, p1  para 4 (accessed  on  
18 October  2007) 
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“Some  of  the  World’s  poor  will  end  up  as  losers  from  a  WTO  agreement. 
Cutting  back  subsidies  to  rich  country  farmers  could  be  good news  to  the  
farmers  who  compete  with them  in  the  developing  world,  but  it  is  surely  bad  
news  to  the  consumers  of  these  crops. They  will  have  to  pay  more  for  their  
food. Some  developing  countries  are  net importers  of  agricultural  products.  
They will  end  up  as  losers  because  they  will  be  paying  higher  prices for  their  
imports  or  no  gain  on  their  exports.”48 
 
The  impact of  reform  on  specific  agricultural  commodities. 
The  elimination  of  export  subsidies  will  have  varying impacts on  certain  
commodities  depending  on  their  use  in  the  staple  diet. All agricultural  
commodities  will  experience  a  price increase.  Whether  or  not  the  increase  has  
positive  or  negative  results  for  individual  nations depends  on  the  staple  diet  of  
the  local  population. 
 
Dairy:  The  global  dairy  industry  benefits  from about  40 %  of  the  total  amount  of  
export  subsidies used. In  this  instance, the  European Union  is  not  surprisingly  the  
world  leader by  providing  80 %  of  the  export  subsidies  on  dairy  products. If  
export subsidies  were  to  be  eliminated,  the  biggest  beneficiaries  are likely  to  be  
the  dairy  producers  in  Cairns  Group  countries  such  as Argentina, Australia and 
New  Zealand. They  would  benefit  due  to  increased  export  opportunities. 
 
Bovine  meat: again  the  European Union  is  leading  provider  of  export  subsidies  
accounting  for  98%  of  the  total   export  subsidies  provided  for  bovine  meat.  The  
elimination  of  export subsidies  has  certain  consequences 
                                                 
48 www.globalpolicy.org , Baker  D, The  WTO  and  the World’s Poor, p1 para 1 (accessed  on  18  October  2007)  
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“The  world  market  price  for  bovine  meat  increases  by  an  additional  1.86  
percentage  points…and  its  additional  welfare gain  is  1.85  billion U.S. dollars.”49 
The  positive  results  of  export  subsidy  elimination  by  the  EU  will  be  felt  on  two  
fronts. Firstly  EU  consumers  benefit  from  a  decrease  in domestic  prices  estimated  
to  be  about  5.16  billion  U.S  dollars  in  total.  The  EU  Commission  benefits  due  
to  the  reduction  in  subsidy  expenditure. 
 
Sugar:  Basically the  same  scenario  applies  to  sugar.  The  major beneficiaries  are  
the  consumers  of  the  EU  as  well as  the  various  EU governments  in  terms  of  
savings  in  expenditure  on  export  subsidies. Major  sugar  producers  such  as  Brazil  
benefit  because  of  an  increase  in  the  world  price  and  increased  opportunities  for  
export.  According  to  the  ATPSM Model,  the  world  price  for  sugar  is  expected  to 
increase  by  2.3  percentage  points 
 
Wheat:  Wheat  is  possibly  the  one  commodity  which  will  result  in  negative  
consequences  should  export  subsidies  be  eliminated. Wheat  and  other  cereals  form  
part  of  daily  staple  diet  of  many  in  least  developed  countries.  The  projected  
increase  in  wheat  prices is  2.55  percentage  points.  According to  the  ATPSM  
model, least  developed  countries  will experience  losses  to  the  tune  of  395 million  
U.S. dollars. According  to  the  same  model these  losses  may  be  offset. 
“However , since  parts  of the  least  developed  country  imports  are  provided  as  
food  aid  and thus  not  fully  paid  for  by  the  beneficiaries, the  negative  impact  
may  be  overstated  if  food  aid  is  continuing  to  be  provided.” 50 
 
                                                 
49 Peters R, Roadblock  to  Reform: The  Persistence  of  Agricultural  Export  Subsidies, p28 para 2 
50 Peters R, Roadblock  to  Reform: The  Persistence  of  Agricultural  Export  Subsidies, p30  para 7   
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With  all  of  these  commodities, major  developing  world  producers  such  as  South 
Africa, Brazil  and  India  gain  as a  result  of  the  increased  export  opportunities.  The  
big  losers  in  the  event  of  export subsidy  elimination  are  the  farmers  and  
commodity  producers  in  the  developed  world.  By  eliminating  one  of  the  support  
mechanisms, farmers, especially  in  the  European  Union,  will  have  to  become  
more  efficient  and  cost-effective  in  their  production  methods.  They  cannot  afford  
to  produce  in  excess  of  the  consumption  needs  of  the  EU  and  they  will  have to 
contend  with  the  added  concern  of  cheaper  commodities  from  developing  country  
producers. 
 
 
11.FINAL  THOUGHTS 
It  is  generally  accepted  that  the  complete  elimination  of  export  subsidies  would  
be  a  good  thing  for the  global  economy.  This  is  especially  true  when  it  comes  
to agriculture.  At  many  WTO  negotiations  the  issue  over export  subsidy  use  in  
agriculture  by  the  developed  world  has  been  a  constant  sticking  point.  There are  
not  many  commentators  or  experts  willing  to  openly  call  for  the  retention  of 
export  subsidies.  They  all  agree that  export  subsidies  should  be  eliminated.  Where  
they  diverge  however,  is  how  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  will  benefit  the  
global  economy.  It  is  clear  that  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  in  world  
agriculture  trade  will  result  in  higher  world  prices  for  commodities.  This  is  good  
news  for  developing  world  producers.  However the  increase  in  world  prices  also  
means  that  the  price  of  food  will  increase.  
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 For  countries  that  are  net  importers of  food,  this  may  result  in  certain  social  and  
economic  problems  for  them. i.e.  more  of  the  government  budget  has  to  be  set  
aside  for  food  procurement  or  the  consumers  have  to  bear the  brunt  of  the  
increased   food  prices. This  can  lead  to  political  dissatisfaction  with the  present  
government. 
 
It  is  understandable  that  least  developed  countries  would  not  be  entirely  in  
favour  of  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies. They  have  become  accustomed  to  
receiving  heavily  subsidised  and  cheap  foodstuffs  from  the  leading  users  of  
export  subsidies, the  European  Union  and  the United  States.  The  elimination  of  
export  subsidies represents  an  opportunity  to  wean  these  states  of  EU  support  and   
force  them  to  take  the  hard  steps  in  developing their  own  agriculture  sectors. 
 
For  South Africa,  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  offers  many  opportunities.  
As  a  major, low  cost  agricultural  commodity  producer, South  Africa   can  take  
advantage  of  the  increased   export  opportunities. This  will  result  in  an  increase  in  
export  revenue  and  a  healthy  boost  to  the  country’s  GDP.  On  the  domestic  
front, the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  will  mean  a  drastic  reduction  in  the  
amount  of  imported  subsidised  foodstuffs.  Since  the  agriculture   sector  will  be  
able  to  generate  more  revenues, this  would  eventually  lead  to  improvements  in  
the  sector  as  well  as  increased  employment  opportunities. With  regard to  South  
Africa’s  trade  with  the  European  Union, the  elimination  of export  subsidies   can  
probably  give  full  effect  to  the  stated  goal  of  creating  a Free  Trade  Area (FTA)  
as  envisioned  by  the  TDCA. With  the  elimination  of  a major  trade  distorting  
instrument, EU  trade  with  South Africa  in  the  agriculture  sphere  will  have  to  be  
conducted  on  a more  even  playing  field.     
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1.INTRODUCTION 
The  role  that   agriculture  plays  in  a  society  cannot  be  underestimated. One  of  the  
functions  of  any  government  is  ensuring  that  a  strong  agriculture  sector  exists, 
strong  enough  to  meet  the  various  needs  of   the  population i.e. the  provision of  
foodstuffs  and  sustenance. Other  activities  related  to  the  agriculture  sector  include  
job  creation  and  revenue  generating  activities.  This  is  particularly  true  in  
developing  and least  developed  countries, where  the major  source  of  employment  
remains  in  the  primary  sector, specifically  the  agriculture  sector. 
 
However  the  role  of  agriculture  as  changed  noticeably  over  the  past  few  
decades.  This  transformation  can  be  attributed  to  the   increasing  focus  on  the  
global  economy  and  concepts  such  as  liberalisation  and  free  trade. In  the  past,  
the major  concern  of  national governments  with  regard to  their  domestic  
agriculture  sector,  was  ensuring  that  the  population  had  enough  to  eat  and  that  
surplus  supplies  were  exported. Governments  were  free  to  support  their  domestic  
sectors  in  any  way  which  they  deemed  fit. The  imposition of  import  tariffs, the  
provision  of  support  payments  to farmers  and  the  provision  of  export  support  
such  as  export  subsidies  were  some  of  the  measures  applied  by national 
governments.  
 
The  global  economy has  however  transformed, particularly  over  the  last  two  
decades.  The  concepts  of  free trade  and  market  liberalisation  has  become  the 
global  trade  mantra. Free-market adherents  argue  that  market  liberalisation  is  the  
way  to  ensuring  an  improved  standard  of  living  for  everyone.  This  has  meant 
that  the  global  agriculture  sector  has  come  under  increased  scrutiny. 
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 Practices  such  as  high  import  tariffs,  domestic  support  payments  and  export  
subsidies  are  regarded  as  hindrances  to  free  trade  and  as  such  are  outmoded  and  
need  to be  eliminated. 
Many, if  not  all  the  countries  which  have  engaged  in  the  large  scale  support  of  
their  agriculture  sectors  are  first  world  industrialised  states. These  countries  have  
the  wealth  and  resources  to  effectively  support  and  insulate their  farmers.  This  is  
not  the  case  with  regard  to  developed and  least  developed  countries.  These 
countries  have  a  natural  advantage  in  agriculture  commodity  production, yet they  
do  not  have  the  financial  resources  to  compete  with  their  first  world  
counterparts.  
 
The  increasing  calls  for  the liberalisation  of global  agricultural  trade  has  
galvanised  developing  countries  into  taking  a  more  assertive  role  in  trade  
negotiations. Developing  country  blocs  such  as  the  G-20  and  the  G-90, have  
called  on  the  industrialised  world, in  particular  the  European  Union  and  the  
United  States  of  America,  to  undertake  significant  reforms  of  their  agriculture  
sectors. The  key  goals  developing nations  hope  to achieve  with  a reformed  global  
trade, is  increased  market  access  to  first  world  markets and  an end  to  the  massive  
subsidy  payments  which   lead  to  lower   world  commodity   prices  and  the  
dumping  of  cheap  agriculture  commodities  on  third  world  markets. 
 
Agriculture  is  quite  a  sensitive  topic  in  international  trade  circles.  Developed  
countries  seem  unwilling  to  undertake  significant  reforms  of  their  agriculture  
sectors  unless developing  countries   reciprocate  by   opening  up  their  markets  to   
industrialised  goods  and  services.  
 
 
 
 
 98
The  developed  world  is  essentially  playing  the ‘carrot-and-stick’ game.  In  return  
for  reform  of the  global  agricultural  trade,  they  want  to  expand  the  markets  for  
their  manufactured  goods. If the  developing  countries  do  follow  suit  and  lower  
their  import  tariffs  on  manufactured and  processed  goods,  this  will  lead  to  
piecemeal  solution. The  agriculture  sectors  will benefit , but  at  the  expense  of  the  
domestic  manufacturing  industries. 
 
There  is  no  easy  solution  where  both sides  emerge  as  winners.  Although  
agriculture  employs  a  very  small  amount of the  total  workforce  in  developed  
countries, the  agriculture  sector  remains  powerful  through  various lobby  groups. 
For  some  reason  the  protection  of  farmers  and  their  livelihoods  scores  highly  in  
public  opinion  polls despite the  overwhelming  urbanised  population  of  developed  
countries. Governments  must  be seen  to be  protecting  rural  communities  and  their  
livelihoods  or  it  could  cost  them  public  credibility  or  worse, votes. 
 
In  developing, and  especially  least  developed  countries, the  issue  of  agriculture  
reform  is  much  more  important. With  many  of  the  population  still  employed  in  
the  primary  sectors  such  as  agriculture, the  reform  process  could result  in  a 
significant  improvement  in  the  standard  of  living  for  billions  of  people.  
Therefore  groups  such  as  the  G-20  have  become  increasingly  fordceful  in  their  
demands  for  a  fully  liberalised  global  trade  in  agriculture. 
 
One  of  the  targets  of  the  ire  of  developing  country  farmers  and  the  subject  of  
this  thesis, is  the  use  of  export  subsidies  by  first  world  countries  to  offload  
surplus  commodities onto  the  world  market. As  I  have  explained  earlier, the  
biggest  offender  in  this  instance  is  the  European  Union.   
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The  export  subsidies  not  only  enable  farmers  in  developed  countries  to  dump  
their  surplus  production  onto  foreign  markets,  this  surplus  flood  leads  to  a  
reduction  in   world  prices, thus  further  impacting  on  the  incomes  of  farmers  in  
the  developing  world. 
 
The  use  of  export  subsidies  has  finally  been  subjected  to closer  scrutiny  and  
guidelines  as  a  result  of  the  World  Trade Organisation’s Agreement  on  
Agriculture.  The  Agreement  has  finally  imposed  restrictions on  the  use  of  these  
trade  distorting  subsidies. 
 
2.CAN  THE  AGRREMENT  ON  AGRICULTURE  EFFECTIVELY  REGULATE  
THE  USE  OF  EXPORT  SUBSIDIES? 
The Agreement on  Agriculture  does not entirely  do  away  with  export  subsidies  but  
rather  calls  on  Member  countries  to  gradually  reduce  their  levels   of  export  
subsidy  use. Developed  countries  have  to  undertake  deeper  cuts  in  their  export  
subsidy  levels  over  a shorter  implementation  period  than  developing countries. 
“Developed  countries  agreed to  reduce  the  volume  of  export  subsidies by  21%  
and  the expenditure on  export  subsidies  by  36%  by  2000; and Developing  
countries  agreed  to reduce the  volume  of  export  subsidies  by  14%  and  the  
expenditure  on  export  subsidies  by  24%  by  2004.” 1 
 
 The  question  is:  are  the  rules  and  guidelines  imposed  by the  WTO  through  the  
Agreement  on  Agriculture  stringent  enough  to  ensure  that  Member  countries  
comply  and  start  reducing  their  use   of  export  subsidies.   
                                                 
1 www.worldbank.org , World  Bank  Group: Agricultural  Trade: Export  Subsidies, p1(accessed  on  26  September  
2007) 
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The  whole  purpose  of  reducing  the  levels  of export  subsidies  is  that  they  should  
eventually  be  eliminated.  Are  Member  countries, especially  rich  industrialised  
states  willing  to  do  that? Publicly, all  the  WTO  Members  have committed  
themselves  to  reduce  and  eventually  eliminate  the  need  for  export  subsidies, 
however  loopholes  do  exist, which  may  be  exploited  by  certain  countries  to  
continue  supporting  their  agriculture  sectors. 
 
Issues  exist  which  may  limit  the  effectiveness  of  the  Agreement  on  Agriculture’s  
framework  for  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies.  These  issues  include  the: 1) the  
choice  of  a base  period  to  determine  the  reduction  commitments  of  Member  
countries, 2) practices  such as ‘frontloading’ and  ‘banking’  with regard  to  export  
subsidies  and 3) the  fact  that  the  Agreement  on  Agriculture  does  not  adequately  
address  indirect  export  subsidy  programmes. 
The  fact  that  export  subsidy  commitments  can  be  potentially  circumvented  is  
worrying. Although certain Member  countries  may  profess  to  complying  with  the  
reduction  commitments  of  the  Agreement  on  Agriculture, nevertheless some  
countries  have  engaged  in  practices  that  can  be  described  as  using  indirect  
subsidies. 
 
‘Front loading’  and  ‘Banking’ 
These  are  two  ways  in  which  the  reduction  commitments  of  the  Agreement  on  
Agriculture  can  be  bypassed. With  regard to  ‘front loading’ ,countries  could  use  
the  1991-1992  base  period  instead  of  the  1986-1990  period  if  their  export  
subsidy  levels  was  higher  than  the  intended  base period. Countries  could  then  
increase their export  subsidy  expenditure  levels  in  excess  of  the 1986-1990  levels.  
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‘Banking’ is  a  practice  which  the  Agreement  on  Agriculture  allows, but  has  been  
exploited  by  certain  Member  countries. The  ‘banking’ practice  involves  the  
rollover  of  unused  subsidies  from  one  year  to  the  next. By  using  the  ‘banking’ 
practice, countries  may  be  able  to  undertake  lower  reduction  commitments  for  
certain  commodities  in  a given  year. 
 “The  ‘banking’  practice  weakens  the  effect  of  the  reductions, because  it  
allows  for  strategic  trade  behaviour  in  exploiting market  share. Banking  unused  
subsidies  could  allow  an  increase  in  subsidies  for  some  commodities  during 
the  implementation  period.”      2 
 
Other policy  instruments 
Although  the  Agreement  on  Agriculture imposes  restrictions  on  the  use  of  direct  
subsidies, there  are  other  policy  instruments  which  can  be  possibly  used  as  a  
way  to  circumvent  those  restrictions.  These  instruments  include  export  credit, the  
provision  of  food  aid, State  Trading  Enterprises  and export  subsidies  paid  on  
commodity  inputs  for  processed  goods. At  this  stage, none  of  these  practices  is  
adequately  regulated  by  an  international  multilateral  framework  such as  the  one  
which  applies  to  direct  export  subsidies. They  all  have  the  potential  to  be  used  
to circumvent  the  export  subsidy  reduction  commitments. 
 
Another  issue  which  needs  to  be addressed, is whether  the  elimination of  export  
subsidies  without  reforms  to  domestic  support  and  market  access  for  developing  
countries  to  first  world  markets  is  sufficient  in  meeting  the  goals  of  the  
proponents  of  export  subsidy  elimination. Export  subsidies  is  but  one  of  the 
pillars  in  the  support  structure  for  first  world  farmers.  
                                                 
2 www.worldbankgroup.org  , World Bank Group: Agriculture: Export  Subsidies, p1 para 6 (accessed  on  26  
September  2007) 
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In  many  instances  the  particular country’s export  subsidy  program  goes  hand  in  
hand  with  high  import  tariffs (market  access)  and  major  support  payments  and  
subsidies to  farmers( domestic support). Many  commentators  have  argued   that   the  
reduction  and  eventual  elimination  of  export  subsidies  has  to  be  accompanied  by  
serious  reform  with  regard  to  domestic  support payments  and  market  access. I  
agree  with  these  sentiments  to  a  certain  extent. Yes, it  is  true  that  developed  
countries  have to  take  a serious  look  at  their  support  programmes  for  their  
agriculture  sectors. But  this argument  cannot  be  used  as  means  to  detract  from  
the need  to  eliminate  export  subsidies.  The  elimination  of  export  subsidies  is  but  
the  first  step  in  the  process  of  agricultural  reform.  The  reform  of  the  global  
agricultural  trade  has  to  be  undertaken  in  stages. The  effective  regulation  and  
then  elimination  of  export  subsidies  is  the  first  step  in  that  reform  process. 
 
 
3.SOUTH  AFRICA  AND  THE  EUROPEAN  UNION: WHERE  DOES  
AGRICULTURE  FIT  IN  THIS RELATIONSHIP? 
As  I  stated  earlier, South  Africa  and the  European Union  share  quite  a close  
trading  relationship.  In  terms  of  agriculture, the  European  Union  accounts  for  
40%  of  South  Africa’s  exports. The  ties  between   South  Africa  and  the  European  
Union  were  strengthened  further  with  signing  of  the  Trade, Development  and  
Cooperation  Agreement (TDCA). South   Africa  enjoys  a unique  relationship  with  
the  EU, that  is  certainly  unparalleled  amongst  other  developing  nations. The  
eventual  aim  of  the  TDCA  is  of  course  the  creation of  a  free  trade  area  between   
South  Africa  and  the  European  Union.  The  question  is, will  this  be  a free  trade 
area  in  name  only  or  will  there  be  real  benefits  to  South Africa?   
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This  is  an  important  question  to  mull over if  you  consider  the European  Union’s  
track  record  when  it  comes  to  free  trade, especially  in  the  agriculture  arena. 
 
The  essential  provisions of  the  TDCA  with  regard  to  agriculture  states  that: 
“The  EU  will  give  duty  free  access  to  61%  of  South  African  agricultural  
products  and  another  13%   will  be  subject  to  preferential  tariff  rules.”   3 
And  further: 
“Approximately  26%  of  South  African  agriculture  exports  have  been put on  the  
reserve  list, in  other words, excluded  from  the  agreement  for  now.”4 
 
It  would  seem that  the  provisions of  the  TDCA  with regard  to  agriculture  have  
been structured  in  such  a   way   that  both  sides  are  kept  satisfied.  South  Africa  
has  gained  duty  free  access  for  most  of  its  agricultural  commodities while  
European  farmers  are  appeased  by  the  fact  that  agricultural  products  where  South  
Africa  has  a competitive  advantage  such  as  dairy, sugar, canned  fruit and  cut  
flowers, have  been  excluded  from  the  ambit  of  the  free  trade  deal  for  now.    
 
An  interesting  situation  arises  as  a result  of  the  calls  for  reform  of  the  European  
Union  agriculture  sector.  Will  South  Africa  be  better  served  by  enjoying  the  
benefits under  the  TDCA such  as  duty  free  access  for  certain  products  or  will  
our  interests  be  best  served  by a  more  transparent  and  reformed  EU  agriculture  
sector  within  a  globally  liberalised  agriculture market?  South  Africa  as  a member  
of  both  the  Cairns  Group and  the  G-20,stands  to  gain  in  terms  of  export  
opportunities  if  the  EU  reforms  with  regard  to  export  subsidies are  carried  
through.  
                                                 
3 Greenberg  S, Raw  Deal- South  Africa-EU  trade  pact, Southern  African  Report  Archive, volume 15 no 4, May  
2000, p16 
4 Supra…p16,para 5 
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South  Africa, along  with  major  agriculture  producers  such  as  Brazil  and  India, are  
in  the  pound  seats  to  take  advantage  of  the reform  process concerning  export  
subsidies. These  countries  agriculture  sectors  are  able  to  produce  their  
commodities  at  a lower  cost  and  in  a  more  efficient  manner. 
 
In  this  thesis,  I  highlighted  South  Africa’s  sugar  industry  to serve  as  an  
illustrative  case in  point. The  European  sugar  industry  is  one  of  the  most  heavily  
subsidised  agriculture  sectors,  creating  major  distortions  within  the  global  trade  in  
sugar.  European  sugar  producers and  processors, although  operating  at highly  
inefficient  levels, are  nevertheless   able  to  sell  their  sugar  more  cheaply  than  their  
counterparts  in  Brazil, South Africa  and  other  developing  country  producers. If the  
European  Union  follows  through  with  its  Hong  Kong  2005  proposal  to  end  their  
use  of  export  subsidies  by  2013, this  will  lead  to  a  rebalancing  of  the  status  
quo. The  European  Union’s  position  as  the  second  largest  exporter  of  sugar  will  
be  usurped  by  smaller  producers  such  as  South Africa. Although  Brazil  stands  to  
gain  the  most  from  a  fully  liberalised  sugar  trade ( due  to  the  large  scale nature  
of  sugar  production  in  Brazil), other  smaller  sugar  producers  such  as  South  
Africa  will  be  able  to  add  hundreds  of  millions  of  rand  in  export  revenues  to  
the  country’s  coffers. 
 
If  we  take  the  sugar  industry  as  a  microcosm  of  South  Africa’s  agriculture  
sector, the  increased  revenue  from  exported  sugar  can  be  ploughed  back  into  the  
industry  and  the  rural  communities  whose  sustainability  invariably  depends  on  the  
success  and  growth  of  agriculture. 
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But  what  about the  TDCA? Would  South  Africa’s  agriculture  sector  not  be  better  
served  by  the provisions  of  the  agreement  which  purports  to  create  a  free  trade  
area.  South  African  agriculture  exporters already  enjoy  preferential  access  for  
certain  commodities  despite  the  minimal  reforms  undertaken  by  the  European  
Union. Essentially  it  boils  down  to  the  question: shouldn’t  the  South  African  
agriculture  sector  be  satisfied  by  what  it  already  enjoys  under the  TDCA  and  not  
push  the  European  Union  for  further  reforms  of  its  agriculture  sector? 
 
In  an  article  written  in  the  year  2000 entitled Raw Deal- South  Africa-EU  trade  
pact, Stephen  Greenberg  highlighted  what  he  thought  were  several  shortcomings  
of  the  TDCA.  He  is  of  the  view  that  South  Africa  drew  on  the  short  end  of the  
stick  when  it  came  to  the  outcomes  of  the  TDCA.  Mr  Greenberg  is  of  the  view   
that  there  would  be  no ‘trickle-down’ effect  when  it  came  to  the  revenues  
generated  from  increased  commodity  exports.  In  other  words, rural  communities  
would  not  share  in  the  benefits  from  increased  revenue  in  agriculture, but  that  
that  the  money  will  be  concentrated  amongst  the  large scale  farmers. 
“Export  earnings remain  in  hands  of  select  few- large privately  owned  farms. 
The  TDCA  does  not  offer  transformation, merely  intensification  of the  
privileges  of  a small  and  already  wealthy  segment  of  the  population.”    5 
Basically  Mr  Greenberg  feels that  the  TDCA  will  be  detrimental  for  the  South  
African  agriculture  industry, leading  to  job  losses  in  certain  sectors  and  a  serious  
knock  in  the  production  of  certain  agriculture  commodities. 
“The  Agreement  is liable  to  result  in  a  shift  in  commercial  production  patterns  
to emphasize  more  profitable  high  value crops.  The  increased  global  
competition  will  lead  to  cuts  in  prices  and profits.”6 
                                                 
5 Greenberg S, Raw  Deal-South Africa-EU  trade pact, Southern  Africa  Report  Archive, volume  15 no4, p16 
6 Greenberg  S, Raw Deal- South  Africa-EU trade  pact, Southern  Africa  Archive , volume  15 no4, p16 
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4.FINAL THOUGHTS 
In  this  thesis  I  have  argued  for  the  elimination  of  export  subsidy  use  when  it  
comes  to  agriculture.  It  is  strange  that  when  it  come  to  industrial  products, 
export  subsidies  are  expressly  prohibited  but  when  it  comes  to  agricultural  
products, there  is  a  tacit  allowance  to  continue  using  export  subsidies.  Despite  
the  fact  that  the  cornerstone  of  WTO  policy  has  been  the  promotion of  free  
trade  among  Member  countries, trade  distorting  measures  such  as  export  subsidies  
has  been  tolerated  for  a  number  of  years.  
 
However  with  the  blocs  who  have  bore  the  brunt  of  export  subsidy  use, namely  
developing  countries,  organising  themselves  into  powerful  cliques  within  the  
WTO, the  issue  over  export  subsidies  use  has  been  more  effectively  addressed. 
Steps  have  been taken  in the  right direction  at  a multilateral  level  to  eliminate  
export  subsidies.  However  the  reduction  commitments  of  the Agreement  on  
Agriculture  have  to  be  stringently  enforced  and  guidelines  have  to  be  developed 
to  regulate  the  use  of  practices  such  as  food  aid  and  export  credit  in  order  to  
bloc  attempts  to  circumvent  the  disciplines  imposed  on  direct  export  subsidies. 
 
With  regard  to  the  European Union,  they  have  taken  an  admirable  stance  
regarding  their  offer  to  end  their  use  of  export  subsidies  by  the  year  2013.  this  
is  a  major  step  in  the  right  direction, if  you  consider  that  the  EU  was  the  
overwhelming  user of  export  subsidies    ( 90%  of  the  total  export subsidies  used ).  
It  is  up  to  the European  Commission  to  follow  up  their  2005 proposals  with  
concrete  steps  to   reform  their  agriculture  sector  to  bring  it  line  with  WTO  
principles. 
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The  elimination of  export  subsidies  will  be  beneficial  for  the  global  economy.  
Major  third  world  commodity  producers  are  the ones  to  benefit  the  most  from  
the  elimination  of  export  subsidies, particularly  the  elimination  of  the  EU’s  export  
subsidies.  Countries  such  as  Brazil, India  and  South  Africa  will  surpass  the  EU  
in  the  production  and  export  of  certain  commodities  such  as  dairy products, sugar  
and  bovine  meat.  
  
Certain  least  developed  countries  will  experience  negative  impacts  as  a result  of  
export  subsidy  elimination.  These  countries  have  become  dependent  on  cheap , 
subsidised food imports (particularly  from  the  EU). These  countries will  have  to  
become  self  reliant  in  the  provision of  their  own  foodstuffs. To  assist   these  
countries in  their  period  of  adjustment, the  first  world, represented  by  the  EU  and  
the  USA, should  develop  assistance  programmes  to  help  these countries  bring  
their  domestic  agriculture  sectors  back  on  track. 
 
South  Africa  will  benefit  along  with  other  major  third  world  producers, when  
export  subsidies  are  finally  eliminated  in  agriculture. Although  South  Africa  
enjoys  a  close  trading  relationship  with  the  European  Union, leading to  the  
creation  of  the  TDCA,  South  Africa  will  benefit  much  more if  the  EU  
agriculture  sector  is  liberalised  and  brought  in  line  with  the  tenets  of   free  trade.  
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